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ABSTRACT 
Despite a spate of research discussing the importance of media in national politics, as 
well as the importance of state legislatures, we know virtually nothing about how 
media and state legislatures work in tandem. Using a survey of state legislators in 
California, Georgia and Iowa, I ask a number of questions regarding this relationship. 
Among my findings. I conclude that state legislators do use media tactics for a variety 
of purposes, although traditional means of legislating still prevail. Next, moving 
from Susan Herbst's (1998) finding that state legislators often use media content as a 
surrogate for public opinion, I examine the ways in which state legislators consume 
media. Here, I find that they consume media from their district more often than 
media from other places. Certainly this has important implications for the changing 
nature of representation in the state legislature. Most importantly, I find most state 
legislators feel similarly about the usefulness of using media tactics, but they vary 
considerably in how often they use those tactics. This variation appears to be a result 
of the resources afforded the legislator, rather than personal or district factors. In the 
end, I make a number of suggestions for future research in this understudied, but 
vitally important area of study. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTIONS, THE DATA AND THE 
OUTLINE 
More than two decades ago, Richard Fenno posited that legislators have three goals: 
reelection, power inside the legislature and good policy (Fenno 1978). The central 
assumption of this dissertation is that in order to attain these three goals, legislators 
must communicate with a variety of audiences. Obviously, in order to be reelected, 
they must communicate with constituents. In order to gain power inside the 
legislature and pass good policy, they must communicate with a variety of political 
elites, including other legislators and organized interests. Since legislators often do 
not have the time to directly communicate with every important actor in the process 
they often instead focus on another low cost, high yield way of communicating-
seeking and using media coverage (Cook 1989). 
Unfortunately, while political scientists have long studied the media's impact 
on elections and voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1956), and how federal 
politicians use the media (Cook 1989; Cook 1998; Hess 1984; Hess 1986; Matthews 
1960) a disconcerting lack of attention has been devoted to understanding how 
politicians and the media interact in the states. Despite anecdotal evidence that media 
have a direct impact on the day-to-day operation of state and local politics, very few 
political scientists have systematically examined this vital political dynamic (Lynch 
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1999). This study begins to fill this gap in the literature by examining how state 
legislators use the media to communicate with a variety of audiences. 
Before continuing, I ask: why this topic? What can we learn? After this, I 
briefly discuss what we know about the relationship between state legislatures and the 
media. Next, I offer the central research questions of this study along with the 
hypotheses that guide them. Next, I review the data used to answer the research 
questions. Finally, this chapter concludes with a glimpse of what is to come in each 
chapter. 
Why State Legislators and the Media? 
Most of what we know about legislative behavior is based on the United States 
Congress. Although we have gained many insights from this literature, these insights 
are subject to one inherent problem. They apply to only one body-the United States 
Congress. As Malcolm Jewell once remarked, "The goal of political scientists is to 
develop generalizations that are not limited to particular times and places" 
(Jewell 1982: 4). Keeping this goal in mind, state legislatures provide one venue to 
test theories of legislative behavior that are not bound to a single institution. State 
legislatures represent 50 different "laboratories of democracy" where theories and 
hypotheses can be tested. This allows the researcher to see how findings vary as to 
any number of factors, including: region, culture, and institutional capacity. 
The study of state legislatures is not only advantageous from a theoretical 
perspective, but also has significant real-world implications. In the last 20 years, 
politicians have placed more power in the hands of the states (Stein 1999; Van Hom 
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1996). Indeed, "Power is shifting from Washington to the states, and the states have 
developed an enhanced institutional capacity to deal with their new responsibilities" 
(Weber and Brace 1999: 11). Known as devolution, this power shift is meant to 
"enhance the responsiveness and efficiency of the federal system, based on the theory 
that state and local governments can do a better job of providing services for citizens" 
(Watson and Gold 1997:1). A recent ex.ample of devolution can be found in the 
Personal Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This act shifted 
responsibility for the support of low-income families from the federal government to 
state governments. Obviously, devolution has increased the power of state legislators 
across the country. Although Americans know little about their state legislators 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), their power and influence is considerable. 
Understanding the behavior of state legislators is central to understanding American 
politics. 
I have established that state legislators are important actors to study for a 
number of theoretical and practical reasons. Nonetheless, the question remains, why 
study their interactions with the media? Certainly, there are many aspects of 
legislative behavior worth studying. Why choose this one? First, media are 
important in American politics. Although it took political scientists a while to 
recognize this, media are an important means through which politicians communicate 
with their constituents. Media are also the primary means through which citizens 
learn about the political world. Certainly, this dynamic deserves to be studied. 
Second, no one has looked at the media's relationship to state legislatures. Despite 
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recent attention to the media's role in Congress (Cook 1989; Cook 1998; Hess 1985; 
Hess 1986, Kedrowski 1996), no one has examined how state legislators use the 
media to complete their jobs. 
Combining these two important but understudied aspects of American politics 
should provide an interesting and salient study in American politics. Although the 
lack of previous research in the area makes the task somewhat daunting, whatever 
conclusions are drawn from this study will provide a marked improvement in our 
knowledge of both state legislatures and the media. 
Media- A Short Definition 
Before continuing, I should stop and define exactly what I mean by "media." I define 
media as any means of mass communication-whether television, newspaper, 
magazine, Internet, radio, or e-mail. While in certain sections, I may discuss a 
particular medium; I am concerned with all forms of media in this dissertation-not 
just television or newspapers. Indeed, one purpose of this dissertation is to compare 
how different media vary in their use by state legislators. 
What We Know About State Politics and the Media 
The received wisdom suggests that media have always been important to state and 
local politicians. More than 30 years ago, Delmar Dunn noted that "Public officials 
often begin their days by examining the local newspaper for stories about themselves 
and other officials and agencies, 'combing it daily for messages about their work'" 
(quoted in Kaniss 1991: 160). Members who wish to legislate successfully must 
work hard to develop a good relationship with the media. State Legislatures 
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magazine recently listed "working with the media" as one of the 15 most important 
tips for being an effective state legislator. The magazine urged state,legislators to "be 
aggressive. Call reporters regularly ... know your local newspapers' deadlines. Call 
writers back promptly" (15 tips 2000). Despite a dearth of empirical evidence, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that state and local government officials recognize the 
importance of the media for their success both electorally and in the policy arena. 
So just how much media coverage do state officials receive? The short 
answer is: not much. Even in print media, which are traditionally more influential in 
the state legislature, the situation seems to be getting worse. The size of capital press 
corps is declining as editors move statehouse reporters to other assignments that they-
consider more profitable (Layton and Walton 1998)1• One analyst notes, "Many 
editors today just don't give a hoot about legislative reporting" (Boulard 2000: 11). 
According to professor of journalism Gene Roberts: 
We were amazed to discover just how many editors today are philosophically 
opposed to governmental coverage in general. It is just in the air. Some 
newspaper companies and editors even go as far as to simply believe that state 
government and all government news is a big tum-off to readers, so they want 
to stay out of it" (Boulard 2000: 12). 
When state government is covered, it tends to be covered by central city news outlets. 
Coverage declines precipitously as one moves into rural markets (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1997; Kaniss 1991). 
5 
While media coverage of state politics in general is poor, coverage does vary 
slightly depending on the medium. Print media cover state politics more often 
(Gormley 1979) and with more detail and quality than broadcast media (Graber 
1989a). For example, on national television, state government news constitutes less 
than 1.5% of all nightly news stories (Graber 1993a). When broadcast media do 
cover state politics, the coverage is often trifling. As with other stories covered by 
broadcast media, the visual, the personal, and the simplistic are emphasized. Stories 
that require background and context are pushed to the ends of the broadcasts or not 
aired at an (Graber 1989a; Graber 1993b; Kaniss 1991). 
In the end, news on state politics often ignores important issues. Moreover, 
the legislature is virtuany ignored, as media focus on stories with more dramatic 
pictorial value (Littlewood 1972). Doris Graber has gone so far as to can state news 
the "neglected step-child" of governmental affairs. She labels state news "a double 
loser'' (1989b), noting that "swiss cheese has more substance than holes while the 
reverse is true for the press" ( 1993b: 19). While few would be surprised at the lack of 
quality news coverage of the states, what is surprising is that television stations that 
devote substantial time to state government news fare no worse in ratings than 
competing stations that ignore such news (Gormley 1978). 
While a few studies have examined the role of the media in gubernatorial 
elections (Rozell 1991; Rozell and Wilson 1996), or the relationship between the 
governor and the media more generally (Beyle 1978), only one recent study has 
1 Although statehouse reporting is down over time, 24 states rebounded in 1999 (Allan and O'Brien 
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looked systematically at the relationship between state legislators and the media. 
Lynch (1999) discovered that state legislative leaders do, in fact, understand the 
importance and salience of the media in state politics. He also finds that legislators 
rank newspapers and wire services as more important than their national counterparts. 
The lack of attention to this subject is particularly surprising considering 
frequent calls for directed research in the study of state legislatures. Malcolm Jewell 
has twice called for bridging the gap between research on congressional and research 
on state legislative research (1976; 1981). Despite the increasing importance of the 
media in American politics, no call for research in state legislatures or state politics 
has suggested addressing the media-state legislature relationship (Brace and Jewitt 
1995; Jewell 1976; Jewell 1981; Jewell 1982). 
As I suggested before, very little is known about media coverage of state 
government. What little is known suggests thaf'ihe media do a fairly poor job of 
covering state government and politics. In the next section, I detail what more we 
questions we will answer about the media and state politics in this dissertation. 
What This Study Examines 
Because we know virtually nothing about the role of the media in state politics, this 
study is primarily descriptive. While I seek to provide a broad framework for 
understanding the role of the media in the state legislature, what I develop certainly 
does not qualify as a theory. Likewise, I do not seek to test any specific theory of 
media politics, as there are none. While the lack of a strong theory to be tested is a 
1999) 
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limitation of this study, it is does not imply that what follows is unimportant. Indeed, 
description can be a vitally important and necessary step on the way to theory 
development. As Dubin states: 
Description ... provides the input for developing units of a theory, its laws of 
interaction, the system states, and the boundaries of the model. Without 
adequate description, we would not have models that connect with the real 
world that man perceives and about which he theorizes (1967:227). 
In order to provide adequate description and move towards a theory of media politics 
in the states, I answer a number of basic questions in this dissertation. Hopefully, 
future scholars can use the results obtained here to help build a theory of media 
politics in the state legislature. The questions I address are as follows. 
First, I ask: how do state legislators in general feel about using the media to 
further their policy goals? Do they view the media enterprise favorably or 
unfavorably? To what extent do state legislators use the media? Do state legislators 
perceive their media efforts as effective? How does these attitudes compare to the 
attitudes of members of Congress? These questions address both behavioral and 
attitudinal issues. In order to obtain a better understanding of how state legislators 
and the media interact, we must find out how they feel about using the media tactics 
as well as how often they use media tactics. Media tactics are ways in which 
legislators attempt to affect the news. Indeed, much can be learned about the media 
enterprise in the states by comparing what legislators think to what they do. As 
Karen Kedrowski commented in her study of the media and Congress, "The 
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difference between media entrepreneurs and their colleagues is fundamentally 
attitudinal first and behavioral second" (1996: 12). A full understanding of the media 
enterprise in the state legislature requires an understanding of both behavioral and 
attitudinal issues. 
I also ask, who uses the media? In other words, what demographic and 
political factors predict how often legislators uses media tactics to achieve their 
goals? There is often the picture of a younger, more telegenic politician who actively 
courts media coverage, while the older, more traditional "workhorses" labor behind 
the scenes. While a number of recent studies have suggested that this is an outdated 
distinction to make regarding members of Congress (Cook 1986; Langbein and 
Sigelman 1989), I intend to see if this stereotype holds for state legislators. 
Next, I ask, how frequently do legislators engage in various strategies of 
media relations? It stands to reason that legishitors will perceive certain media 
activities as more worthy of expending time and energy than others. Some activities 
reach mass audiences while others reach only select audiences. Some require a large 
expense of resources while others do not. Do legislators make distinctions along 
these lines? For example, I ask, how often do legislators issue press releases versus 
how often do they appear on public access television? A related question asks, how 
often do legislators engage in media-related activities as opposed to more traditional 
means of legislating? 
Next, using the stages model of the policy process (Del.eon 1999), I ask, 
when in the policy process are legislators most likely to use media tactics? There is 
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considerable debate over when legislators engage in media strategies (Kedrowski 
1996). Traditionally, it has been assumed that the media is used overwhelmingly in 
the agenda-setting stage of the policy process. I seek to find if this assumption holds 
in the state legislature, or if the media is used at other stages of the policy process. 
Finally, our understanding of the media-state legislature relationship would be 
incomplete without asking, whom do state legislators seek to reach with their media 
strategies? Some scholars have suggested that legislators often use the media to reach 
other legislators and members of the policy community (Kedrowski 1996), while 
others suggest they aim only to reach constituents with their media efforts (Hess 
1991). Obviously, this is a central and important question that must be answered 
before any theory of the media' role in the stage legislature can be developed. 
Throughout my discussion of each of these questions, I refer to the 
conclusions of congressional scholars examining similar questions in order to move 
toward a more general theory of the media and politics. 
The Data 
There are over 5,000 state legislators in the United States. Unfortunately, cost 
prohibited a survey of the universe of state legislators. Instead, I chose to survey the 
population of state legislators in three states: California, Georgia and Iowa. 
Researchers who conduct comparative state research and are unable to examine the 
universe of states must opt for either a most similar or most different systems design 
(Collier 1993). A most similar systems (MSS) design examines states with similar 
characteristics. The advantage of MSS is that the researcher is able to make stronger 
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conclusions about that particular type of state, providing high internal validity. 
Consequently, MSS is disadvantaged when it comes to making generalizations about 
states in general. Hence, it is low in external validity. A most different systems 
(MOS) design provides the researcher with high external validity, but much lower 
internal validity (Przeworski and Tune 1970; Przeworski 1987). In other words, 
researchers using MOS are able to make generalizations about all states with more 
confidence, but are less confident when making statements about one particular type 
of state. As this dissertation is concerned with moving towards a theory of media 
politics in the states, not in a few particular states, a most different systems approach 
was chosen. I should also note that the majority of recent studies examining 
legislative behavior in the states (i.e. Freeman and Richardson 1996; Richardson and 
Freeman 1995; Thomas 1991) utilize an MOS approach. The characteristics of both 
MOS and MSS designs can be found in Table 1. All tables and figures can be found 
in Appendix A. 
Consistent with MOS, the three states selected were chosen with an eye to 
providing the broadest array of political and geographic characteristics. Those 
characteristics are reviewed below. 
California, Georgia and Iowa all differ as to region, population, legislative 
professionalism, political culture, public opinion/policy liberalism, and the structure 
of media markets. While region and population are fairly self-explanatory, the last 
four criteria deserve brief explanation. 
11 
Legislative Professionalism 
States differ as to legislative professionalism. Briefly, "state legislative 
professionalism generally refers to the enhancement of the capacity of the legislature 
to perform its role in the policy making process with an expertise, seriousness and 
effort comparable to that of other actors in the process" (Mooney 1994:70-71). 
Professionalism has been a hot topic in political science, as almost all states have 
become more professional over the last 20 years (Pound 1992). Professionalism has 
been linked to "the frequency of legislator-citizen contacts, decision-making process 
of the legislature, propensity to alter the committee structure and legislative 
efficiency" (King 2000:328). 
Although there are a number of different measures of professionalism (Grum 
1971; Morehouse 1983; Citizens Conference on State Legislatures 1971; Bowman 
and Kearney 1988; King 2000), most agree that facilities, session length, size of 
support staff and legislative salaries are among the most important indicators of the 
concept. Despite the wealth of choices in indices, Mooney (1994) found that all 
measures are similar and the choice of measure matters little. Given this conclusion, I 
have chosen Peverill Squire's measure of professionalism (Squire 1993). The scale is 
a combination of three factors (pay, session length and staff), which makes the scale 
fairly simple to understand and easy to replicate. Furthermore, it uses the common 
standard of the United States Congress. This means that the US Congress always 
receives a score of 100 and each state legislature's professionalism is measured as a 
proportion of this score. This too aids in interpretation (Mooney 1994). Finally, 
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Squire's score was updated in 2000 (King 2000), making it the most up-to-date 
measure of professionalism. In short, although any measure would produce similar 
results, the Squire measure provides the most easily interpretable and recently 
updated measure. Using this measure, (King 2000), I find that the states differ as to 
professionalism. While California is the most professional legislature, Iowa fa]]s just 
under the mean score and Georgia ranks near the bottom in professiona1ism (See 
Table 2 for specific scores). 
Political Culture 
The states selected also differ as to political culture (Elazar 1966). Political 
culture is defined by Daniel Elazar as "the particular pattern of orientation to political 
action in which each political system is embedded" (Elazar 1966:79). Political 
culture has been linked to, among other things, a state's economic development, 
attitudes towards business and general policy outeomes (Bowman and Kearney 
2000). Although numerous critiques have been made (Lieske 1993), Daniel Elazar's 
typology of political culture remains the standard measure. Elazar posits that three 
po1itical cultures exist in the United States. First, an individualistic political culture is 
one in which government is viewed as secondary to the liberty and freedom of the 
individual. Generally speaking, people in this culture oppose excessive government 
interference. The second culture is moralistic. In this culture, citizens are expected to 
work towards the "greater good." Government can be used as a means to reach this 
goal. FinaUy, a traditionalistic political culture is marked by hierarchy and order. 
Government should not displace the existing order. While each region of a state may 
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exhibit a slightly different culture, the states examined in this study can broadly be 
defined as Individualistic/moralistic (California), traditionalistic (Georgia) and 
moralistic/individualistic (Iowa). While other, more methodologically sophisticated 
measures of cultures may provide slightly different interpretations of political culture 
(see, for example Lieske 1993), the vastly different populations of California, Georgia 
and Iowa suggest that regardless of the specific measure, states differ as to culture. 
Public Opinion 
State public opinion is quite simply, a measure of the aggregate political 
ideology of citizens in any given state. These opinions are considered in relation to 
the traditional scale of liberalism-conservatism. Although there are a number of 
measures of public opinion in the states, the most frequently cited and sophisticated 
measure was developed by Erikson, Wright and Mciver (Hereafter EWM) (1989; 
1987; 1993). EWM refer to their measure as policy liberalism. A high score on their 
scale is associated with a very liberal citizenry, while a low score indicates a state 
with a very conservative citizenry. According to EWM's measure, Arkansas is the 
most conservative state in the country, garnering a score of-1.54, while New York 
ranks as the most liberal state with a score of 2.12. EWM also find that public 
opinion of the electorate, rather than the partisan control of the legislature, or the 
economic conditions of the state is the best predictor of policy outcomes in the states. 
While related, the notion of state public opinion is distinct from culture. EWM define 
culture as "only that portion of state public opinion that cannot be accounted for by 
the group characteristics of the state electorate" (1987:798). Thus, culture and 
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opinion are complimentary but theoretically distinct concepts. California, Georgia 
and Iowa all reside on different ends of EWM's scale. While California receives a 
policy liberalism score of 1.49, Georgia receives a score of .44 and Iowa receives a 
score of -1.04 (Erikson, Wright and Mciver 1993). The characteristics of the selected 
states can be found in Table 2. 
Media Stmcture 
Finally, each state has vastly a different media structure. California has a 
number of large media markets (e.g. San Francisco, Sacramento, Los Angeles and 
San Diego). Georgia is dominated by one media market (Atlanta), has a smaller 
market (Savannah) and is also influenced by a nearby state's market-Jacksonville, • 
Florida. While Iowa has no media markets with over 1,000,000 households, 
(Broadcasting and Cable Yearbook 1999), it is dominated by the presence of the Des 
Moines market. While Davenport, Cedar Rapidg and a host of other small cities have 
television stations and newspapers; it is nonetheless Des Moines media (in particular, 
the Des Moines Register) that dominate the state. 
In sum, I chose three states that varied on as many dimensions as possible. 
California, Georgia and Iowa display markedly different characteristics on scales of 
professionalism, political culture and policy liberalism/public opinion. They also 
reside in different regions of the country (West, Midwest and East, respectively), 
have different sized populations (CA=33,871,648; IA=2,926,324; GA=S,186,453) 
and have different media structures. The differences ensure that the conclusions 
gleaned from this study will be generalizeable to as many different states as possible. 
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Once I determined the states, it was time to create the survey instrument. 
Although the instrument is included in Appendix B, a few notes about its construction 
are in order. Indeed, far too many studies in state politics utilize survey data, but do 
not adequately explain the methodology used (Maestas, Neeley and Richardson 
2001). 
The survey was created to correspond with Dillman's Total Quality Method 
(1978). The survey totaled seven pages, equal to the number of pages in recent 
surveys (e.g. Hedge, Button and Spear 1996) and fewer than the ten to twelve page 
maximum suggested by Dillman (1978). Open-ended questions were kept to a 
minimum. The questionnaire was designed so that respondents could complete the 
instrument in less than ten minutes. In keeping with the suggestion of Maestas, 
Neeley and Richardson that "researchers should standardize question wording and 
response scales for commonly studied concepts," (2001: 14) I use many of the same 
questions used by Kedrowski (1996) in her study of media entrepreneurship in the 
U.S. Congress. Utilizing many of the same questions not only alleviates many 
concerns of question validity, but enables me to make more direct and conclusive 
comparisons between the activities of members of Congress and state legislators. 
I enclosed a brief cover letter and a self-addressed stamped envelope with the 
survey instrument. In order to increase credibility with respondents, the cover letter 
was printed on University of Tennessee, Department of Political Science letterhead. 
Keeping with Dillman's suggestions (1978), the cover letter was brief. It reviewed 
the purpose of the survey, stressed the importance of each individual response and 
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assured respondent confidentiality. For a copy of the cover letter, please see 
Appendix 1. 
After a first wave of surveys was sent and responses were received, a second 
wave was sent to nonrespondents. A favorable response rate of 38.2% was achieved 
for the entire survey. The response rate never fell below 30% for any of the three 
states surveyed (California= 31 %, Georgia=31 %, Iowa= 50% ). This surpasses the 
response rate of recent published works sampling members of Congress (Kedrowski 
1996; Kedrowski 2000) as well as state legislators and their staff (Button and Hedge 
1996; Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 2001). 
Due to time constraints, staff members often fill out survey instruments rathei 
than legislators themselves (Hess 1984; Kedrowski 1996). Consistent with 
Kedrowski (1996), rather than ignore this potential bias, respondents were asked to 
indicate whether they were a legislator or a staff member. Staff members who did 
complete the instrument were instructed to respond in relation to the opinions and 
strategies of their representative, rather than their own personal opinions. Legislators 
completed 77% of the surveys, while staffers completed 23%. The average staff 
member who filled out the instrument had worked for his/her current employer for 2 
½ years. The results from legislators and staffers differed in no substantive way. 
Evidence suggests the legislators who returned surveys bear striking 
resemblance to the population of all legislators in the sampled states. Table 3 shows 
that the two groups differ little as to party, sex or chamber. The only place where the 
sample differs to any substantial degree is in relation to party. The sample of 
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legislators in California and Iowa is slightly more Republican than the population in 
the same states. Although I do not have responses from the universe of legislators, 
considering the response rate, techniques used to construct the survey and evidence 
about the population who responded, I feel confident that the data were collected 
appropriately and that the results are valid and reliable. 
What Follows 
This dissertation has implications for both legislative representation and the po1icy 
process in the states. Chapter 2 lays out a framework for how understanding how the 
media affect the process of representation in the states. Since political 
communication is stilJ a relatively new subfield in political science, it is quite rich in 
description, but often lacking in theory (Bennett 1990; Cook 1998). As such, I posit 
no specific theory of how the media affect the process of representation. Instead, I 
develop a broad framework from which to understand the results presented in 
subsequent chapters. 
After developing an understanding of the media's role in legislative 
representation, I then focus on how state legislators use the media to achieve their 
legislative goals of reelection, good public policy and power inside the legislature. 
Since no extant work exists on how state legislators use the media to achieve these 
goals, I rely instead on the work by Timothy Cook (1989; 1998), Stephen Hess (1984; 
1986), Burdett Loomis (1988), and Karen Kedrowski (1996) about how members of 
Congress use the media to achieve legislative goals. 
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Finally, Chapter 2 reviews what we know about how media content influences 
the opinions, knowledge, priorities and choices of individual citizens. After all, if the 
media do not affect what people believe about politics, then why would legislators 
use media to achieve legislative goals? 
In short, Chapter 2 provides context for this dissertation and suggests where 
the media fit into broader questions of legislative behavior. While understanding how 
legislators use the media may help us understand a portion of legislative behavior, it 
is only a portion. Thus, this dissertation addresses one piece, albeit an important 
piece of the puzzle of legislative behavior. Taken as a whole, Chapter 2 serves two 
roles. First, it provides a brief review of the salient literature on legislative behavior·; 
and political communication. Second, and more importantly, it presents a framework 
to understand how the media fit into broader issues of legislative behavior. While 
Chapter 2 does not posit a specific theory of the role of the media in the state 
legislature, it does work towards this ultimate goal. 
Chapter 3 begins the data analysis. This chapter answers the most basic 
questions in the study. First, it addresses to what extent state legislators use the 
media. Despite frequent suggestions that media are important in state legislatures 
(Rosenthal 1998), no one has established if this is in fact true. After establishing that 
many state legislators do, in fact use media tactics, I ask which legislators use such 
tactics. In other words, what factors predict whether a legislator will utilize media 
strategies in the completion of her job? Next I ask, what audiences do they seek to 
reach with these tactics? Although few doubt that politicians utilize the media to 
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reach constituents, there is considerable debate as to whether politicians utilize the 
media to reach other audiences (For both sides of the debate, see Hess 1986 and 
Kedrowski 1996). This chapter weighs in on this debate. Next, I discuss the 
frequency with which state legislators utilize media tactics as opposed to more 
traditional means of legislating. Finally, this chapter addresses when in the policy 
process legislators use media tactics. As a whole, this chapter discusses the who, 
what, when, where and why of the relationship between state legislators and the 
media. 
Chapter 4 looks at the other side of the press-state legislative connection by 
addressing media consumption by state legislators. In particular, I seek to find out 
how often legislators utilize the media as a source for information. More specifically, 
I discuss what factors determine which legislators use which medium. Taken in 
conjunction with Chapter 3, this should provide the reader with both sides of the 
press-government relationship. 
While the first four chapters focus mainly on traditional media, Chapter 5 
looks at the role of the "new media" in the state legislature. In particular, it looks at 
how legislators use email and the Internet to communicate with a variety of 
audiences. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. The results gleaned from the previous 
chapters are reviewed and placed into a larger framework. Keeping in mind that this 
is a dissertation mostly about legislative behavior, Chapter 6 discusses how this study 
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has improved our knowledge of legislative behavior in the states. Finally, I conclude 
with some suggestions for future research directions in the area. 
Summary 
Despite evidence of the growing importance of state politics (Van Hom 1996) and the 
continued importance of the media in politics (Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999), virtually 
no one has tried to understand how the media and state politics work in conjunction. 
In this dissertation, I try to do just that. Whatever the conc1usions, the evidence 




SETTING THE STAGE 
Three separate streams of literature infonn this study. First, as I mentioned in 
Chapter l, the primary assumption of this work is that legislators use media to 
achieve three legislative goals: reelection, good public policy and power inside the 
legislature. As a result, I review the literature about these three goals, focusing on 
what we know about how media tactics help legislators realize these goals. In order 
for these tactics to work, we must next establish the ways in which media affects the 
priorities, beliefs and choices of individual citizens. Fortunately, there is a 
tremendous amount of literature that examines these very questions. I review this 
literature next. Finally, any study about legislatures must speak to issues of 
representation. As a result, the third section of this chapter briefly reviews what we 
know about legislative representation, focusing on how media relations impact 
representation in the states. 
Achieving Legislative Goals 
First, we return to Richard Fenno's triad of legislative goals. Fenno claims that 
legislators have three goals: reelection, pow.er inside the legislature and good public 
policy (1978). In order to reach these goals, they must communicate with a variety of 
audiences. In order to gain reelection, legislators must communicate with 
constituents. In order to gain power inside the legislature, they communicate with 
policy elites. Finally, in order to achieve good public policy, they must communicate 
with both constituents and political elites. Although there are a number of means of 
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communication, one primary way is through the media. If a legislator gains media 
coverage, she may reach a number of audiences at one time. Gaining media coverage 
can be a low-cost, high-yield means of communication. In this chapter, I discuss each 
of these roles in more detail, discussing what we know about how media is used to 
accomplish these goals. 
Reelection 
The majority of the literature in political communication has focused on how 
media consumption affects individual vote choice. This literature spans from the 
early debate over maximum verses minimum effects to current disagreements over 
the impact of negative advertising. While this literature will be reviewed in tum, 
suffice it to say, scholars now agree that an aggressive media campaign can increase a 
legislator's chance of reelection. Indeed, the ability to easily gain media coverage is 
one of the main advantages afforded incumbent legislators (Herrnson 1998). While 
the legislator does not have complete control over the content of media coverage, 
"media endorsements and campaign coverage can have a significant impact on 
elections" (Herrnson 1998:191). While this dissertation does not focus on explicitly 
campaign-related activities, it does deal with legislators' efforts to reach constituents. 
Certainly reelection concerns are always present in any communication with 
constituents. 
Achieving Good Policy 
In one of the seminal works on the public policy process, Cobb and Elder 
(1983) posited that there are two parallel policy agendas: the systemic agenda and the 
formal agenda. The systemic agenda consists of the ideas under consideration by the 
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public. The forma] agenda consists of those issues under consideration by po1itical 
elites. Legislators attempting to make policy can either influence the formal agenda 
directly, or may work through the systemic agenda with the hopes that items on the 
systemic agenda will eventually reach the forma1 agenda. 
Regardless of which agenda they choose to influence, legislators have a 
number of ways of achieving policy success. They may talk directly to other 
legislators to convince them to support their po1icy (Arnold, Deen and Patterson 
2001). They may actively participate in committee to gain passage of an important 
bill (Hall 1996). They may directly lobby the executive branch to help gain support 
(Fisher 1998). They may contact a variety of organized interests to rally support 
(Ainsworth 1997). Fina11y, they may gain media coverage. This media coverage 
may be aimed at the public, thus influencing the systemic agenda, or may be aimed at 
po1itical elites, thus influencing the formal agenda. Although there is no extant 
literature addressing how state legislators may use the media in the policy process, 
some literature does exist on how members of Congress use the media to further their 
policy agendas. While these findings certainly do not translate directly to the state 
]egislature, they do provide us with a nice point of departure. 
Prior to the 1980s, it was assumed that media were important players in 
legislative politics, although there was little hard evidence. Donald Matthews (1960) 
suggested that senators often cultivate relationships with journalists to receive good 
coverage. Matthews assumed that this coverage was used for a number of purposes, 
including but not limited to, communicating with other legislators. According to 
Matthews, if a legislator gamers positive media coverage, the chances of that 
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legislator passing legislation increase. Matthews' findings thus suggest that media 
relations constitute another nontraditional means of achieving policy success. 
Surprisingly, while most studies of Congress throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
gave passing mention the role of the media in the policy process, these studies shed 
little light on exactly how the media were used in the policy process. In short, by 
1985, conventional wisdom suggested that media were used in the policy process 
(e.g. Ranney 1983; Robinson 1981), but we didn't know how or why. 
In a radically different interpretation of the media's role on the legislative 
process, Stephen Hess ( 1986) concluded that the power of the press in the lawmaking 
process is often overstated. He admits, however, that "some legislators acting out of 
optimism or ignorance or arrogance, may choose to use the media even though it is a : 
highly inefficient legislative strategy," (1986:103). He answers, however, that these 
members are the exception rather than the rule. According to Hess, 
Trying to use the media to get legislation through Congress is a Rube 
Goldberg design based on (A) legislator influencing (B) reporter to get 
information into (C) news outlet so as to convince (D) voters who will then 
put pressure on (E) other legislators. Given all of the problems inherent in 
successfully maneuvering through the maze, no wonder that legislative 
strategies are usually variations of (A) legislator asking (B) other legislators 
for their support" (Hess 1986: 103). 
In short, while Hess admits that legislators may use the media to communicate with 
constituents to gain reelection, he denies that legislators use the media to achieve 
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policy success. According to Hess, the media cannot help effect what occurs in the 
policy arena, they can only reflect it. 
Although Hess' work continues to stand as a caution to scholars who get 
overly enthusiastic about the value of the media as a tool in the policy process, his 
conclusions have been questioned by scholars in recent years. For instance, Tim 
Cook argues: 
Congress has shifted in the last fifty years from an institution where its 
members dealt almost exclusively with the press back home in their 
constituencies for electoral purposes (with a few high-profile exceptions of 
investigations or mavericks) to one where both backbenchers and leaders 
routinely seek national publicity to influence national policy (1998b:150). 
Certainly, using the media is not the only way legislators achieve legislative 
success. But proper attention to the media may help a bill that otherwise would have 
been assured failure. Alternatively, legislators may use media to help kill legislation 
that they oppose. As New York Representative Tom Downey commented, 
Seeking publicity is one way-an important way-of conveying your 
message. Ultimately that results in good legislation. There are a lot of people 
who do good work around here, but that doesn't necessarily mean that you'll 
get recognized for it. Not getting publicity limits your effectiveness ... .I can't 
think of someone around here who's effective just by being on the inside 
(Loomis 1988:80). 
Simply stated, making laws and making news are often complimentary (Cook 1989). 
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In this strongest defense of the notion that legislators use media to legislate, 
Karen Kedrowki (1996) introduces the concept of the media entrepreneur in 
Congress. Kedrowski posits that members often use the media to influence public 
policy. According to Kedrowski, this includes efforts to reach the formal agenda. 
''These efforts are distinct from members' efforts to use the media to communicate 
with constituents or to campaign for reelection" (Kedrowski 1996: 191 ). Members 
who frequently use the media in the policy process are known as media 
entrepreneurs. The media entrepreneur first attempts to gain the media's attention. 
Garnering media attention in tum gains the interest of other audiences and often leads 
to more media attention. The advantages of the former are quite obvious. If a 
legislator can reach organized interests, policy elites, and other legislators with her 
message, this can provide an unconventional and often successful way to increase the 
likelihood of getting her way on the issue. Scholars have frequently suggested that 
this results in a dichotomy between show-horse legislators who do little work and 
spend their time trying to gain media attention, and work-horses who shirk media 
attention and instead work hard behind the scenes to pass good policy (Payne 1980). 
Kedrowski's findings refute this oft-cited conclusion. Once again, it appears that 
gaining media coverage and passing good policy often go together. This process of 
media entrepreneurship is summarized in Figure 1. 
Media entrepreneurs are most likely to be non-southern, young, liberal 
Democrats. Kedrowski found no relationship to seniority, however. "In other words, 
at all levels of tenure (over and above age, party, and ideology), members of 
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Congress seem to agree that the news media can work beneficially to accomplish 
policy goals" (Cook 1998: 251). 
In sum, Kedrowski's work suggests that members use the media to 
communicate with a variety of audiences for a variety of purposes. Work examining 
media and Congress should no longer view media strategies as focused so1e1y on 
reaching constituents and securing ree1ection. Media strategies can be used to reach a 
number of policy elites and are frequently used in the policy process. Ree]ection is 
not the only goal of legislators, nor is it the only goal of media strategies. As one 
member of Congress stated, 
You get pub1icity around here for three reasons: First, to get re-elected. 
Second, on behalf of a cause; there are 435 people there, [and] it's tough to 
get them interested ... [if you get the media] other members pay attention, 
especial1y if you're down on the lower half of the order. Third, there's 
political advancement (Loomis 1988: 101). 
Power Inside the Legislature 
Media coverage may also increase a legis1ator' s power inside the 1egislature. 
By gaining coverage and increasing legislator's visibility, a legislator may create the 
notion that she is a "player" in Washington, thus increasing her power inside the 
institution. This increased visibility may also help the politician who has higher 
career ambitions. If a legislator becomes more powerful in relation to the rest of the 
body, she may be more successful in running for higher office. Likewise, she may 
have an easier time gaining positions of power within the legislature (such as speaker, 
majority 1eader, etc.). 
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Why Are Media Strategies Increasingly Common? 
It is clear from this literature that members of Congress increasingly use 
media tactics in their jobs. Surely legislators have always sought to achieve 
reelection, good policy and power within the legislature. Why, then are media tactics 
increasingly used to achieve these goals? First, seniority is less important in 
Congress. than it once was (Davidson and Oleszek 1998; Sinclair 1997). Junior 
members now frequently draft legislation. This makes it much easier for them to gain 
coverage. The universe of members who can gain coverage is thus much larger than 
it once was. Second, subcommittees are now more important in Congress. This gives 
more members credibility on issues by virtue of being a subcommittee chair 
(Kedrowski 1992). Third, even outside of committees and subcommittees, members 1 
often become specialists on one particular issue. If a member is known as a 
specialist, it gives her credibility on that issue and thus makes it easier to gain 
' , 
coverage on that issue (Kedrowski 1992). Fourth, there has been a tremendous 
growth in Congressional staff since the 1970's (Davidson and Oleszek 1997). A 
number of these staff members are now assigned to press relations (Cook 1988). This 
has increased the number of people trying to gain media coverage in every 
congressional office. Finally, the number of interested parties has increased 
dramatically in Washington. The number of organized interests has increased 
exponentially in the past few decades (Nownes 2001). Likewise, the size of the 
federal bureaucracy and White House staff is massive. As a result, it is well nigh 
impossible for a legislator to talk to each actor in the process. Gaining media 
coverage is a way to reach a number of actors in the process with a single effort. 
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Nature of Media Coverage: A Caution 
Throughout this dissertation, I discuss legislators' efforts to gain media 
coverage. Before continuing, I should note that legislators do not always receive 
media coverage just because they want it. Nor does the coverage they receive always 
look how they want it to. Indeed, the legislator does not have complete control over 
the production of news. According to Tim Cook, the politician/media relationship 
can best be understood as a "negotiation of newsworthiness" in which the two sides 
bargain with each other to achieve their desired outcomes (Cook 1989). Each side 
has a desired outcome that may be at odds with the desired outcome of the other 
party. Neither the press nor the member (Cook 1998b) dominates this "coproduction" 
of news. Each side helps shape the final output of news. Although members' press 
strategies can be quite useful in setting the tone, context and alternatives of both 
political elites and the public (Cook 1999), they are not universally successful. 
Likewise, this section has illuminated the nature of the impact of media on the 
policy process. We have learned that: (1) There are many ways to achieve policy 
success; (2) A decentralized Congress that is beginning to shed its tradition of stiff 
hierarchy has led to an increasing number of legislators who use media coverage as 
one means of achieving policy success; (3) Legislators use media most often to set the 
agenda in Congress; (4) The oft-cited distinction between work-horses and show-
horses is no longer true (if it ever was); (5) Neither the legislator nor the journalist 
unilaterally determines what will be covered on the news. Instead, they both engage 
in a negotiation of newsworthiness that determines what the content of congressional 
media coverage will look like. 
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Transition to the States 
While the above literature gives us a good picture of how members of 
Congress use media to impact the policy process, it tells us little about how state 
Jegislators use media to impact the policy process. Unfortunately, no extant literature 
discusses how state legislators use media in, or out of the policy process. Certainly, 
while members of Congress and state legislators work in similar environments, they 
are not identical. While many state legislators maintain other jobs (Rosenthal 1998), 
most members of Congress are full time politicians. Members of Congress have large 
staffs at their disposal, while state legislators may be forced to share staff with 
another legislator. Further, state legislators do not fit most of the traditional standards 
of newsworthiness. As discussed in Chapter l, news on the state legislature is 
infrequent and generally poor. One purpose of this study is to see how these 
differences manifest themselves in the media strategies of state legislators and 
members of Congress. Indeed, discovering the differences between these two 
populations can move us towards a much better understanding of the role of media in 
American legislative behavior. 
The Media Effects Studies 
The previous section established that legislators often use media to help achieve their 
goals of reelection, good policy, and power inside the legislature (Fenno 1978). 
Inherent within this is the assumption that individuals can and do learn from the 
media. After all, if media content has no impact on their attitudes, opinions and 
information, then legislators' media strategies would be wasted. This section gives a 
brief overview of how citizens learn from the media and answers two central 
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questions: (1) Does media content impact people's attitudes, opinions, choices and 
information? (2) If so, how? 
When scholars first began to study the importance of the media for affecting 
individual opinion and choice, they were guided by the theory of the "hypodermic 
effect." This view suggested that the media had a tremendous impact on people's 
attitudes and opinions. This impact was suggested to be equivalent to a hypodermic 
needle injecting the audience with media content and message (Klapper 1960). It did 
not take long for political scientists to attempt to apply this theory to the voting booth. 
The logic was that if media impact were "hypodermic," then media coverage of 
elections would directly influence people's vote choice. If the media treated one 
candidate positively, for example, the people would likewise follow in their positive 
evaluation of that candidate. 
A number of scholars attempted to corroborate this hypothesis. What they 
found, however, was that the media did not have a "hypodermic effect" on people's 
opinions. In fact, they concluded that the media's impact on people's opinions was 
minimal (Katz and Lazarfeld 1955; Klapper 1960). Media coverage seemed to have 
little impact on people's vote choice or general attitude towards specific candidates. 
According to early media scholars, the media's only impact on citizen opinion was to 
reinforce previously held opinions and preferences. (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 
1962; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
1954). 
The remarkable consistency of vote preferences and citizen opinion was 
attributed to two factors. First, voters have "standing commitments" which make 
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them less apt to be swayed by campaign messages. Second, those most likely to pay 
attention to election coverage are those with the strongest partisan loyalties. These 
individuals tend to have fairly consistent and closely held beliefs (Ansolabehere, 
Iyengar and Simon 1997) and consume media that does not cha11enge their previously 
held belief. In other words, a conservative citizen will tend to consume media with a 
conservative tilt. Likewise, libera1s consume media that tends to have a liberal 
perspective. For instance, the majority of listeners to the notoriously conservative 
Rush Limbaugh program are extremely conservative (Barker 1998). This "selective 
exposure" has later become known as cognitive dissonance theory (Zillman and 
Bryan 1985). 
While the conclusions of Berelson et a1. (1954) were successful in shattering ; 
the hypodermic effect, their work has come under fire for methodological reasons. 
For example, Hovland (1959) suggested that Berelson et al's use of national polls in 
order to measure short-term change is a bit suspect. "National polls are not well-
equipped to detect short-term swings in political opinions in response to specific 
stimuli" (Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon 1997: 151). 
While the minimal effects conclusion was corroborated during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (Patterson and McClure 1975; Patterson 1980; Zajone 1980; 
McGwire 1985), scholars in recent years have questioned whether the effects of the 
media on vote choice might be more substantial (Finkel 1993). Some critics believe 
that as a result of increased independent and uncommitted voters (Allsop and 
Weisberg 1988; Mendelsohn and O'Keefe 1976), as well as decreased party 
affiliation (McCubbins 1992; Patterson 1993), the effects of the media on vote choice 
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might have increased in the 1990s. Furthermore, minimal effects conclusions were 
based almost exclusively on cross-sectional surveys. This method cannot show 
individual opinion or preference change, but can merely show one snapshot of time 
(Finkel 1993). Obviously, the exclusive use of cross-sectional analysis presents 
serious methodological barriers to any conclusion regarding attitude and opinion 
change over time (Bartels 1993; Arterton 1978; Sigelman and Rosenblatt 1996). 
Furthermore, a number of scholars have found that in congressional campaigns 
(Herrnson 1997; Goldenberg and Traugott 1983), primary election campaigns 
(Bartels 1988; Orren and Polsby 1987), and other elections where candidates are not 
well known, the media's impact on vote preference may be considerably more 
substantial. In short, due to methodological considerations and the changing 
American political environment, scholars began to question the wisdom of the 
minimal effects conclusion in the· t 990s. 
In response to questions about the applicability of previous work, Steven 
Finkel (1993) revisited the question and found data both supporting and refuting the 
minimal effects conclusion. Although Finkel finds little evidence that the media 
directly alter voter loyalties between April and October of an election year, he 
concludes that the potential for such preference shift certainly exists. Panel studies 
suggest "if there were larger changes in the overall distributions of presidential 
approval or in the perceptions of the two candidates' competence and integrity, the 
effects of the campaign on the vote would have been more considerable" (Finkel 
1993: 18). Furthermore, while the media may not cause a large number of individuals 
to shift their preference, it may foster higher or lower turnout that in tum helps one 
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candidate at the expense of the other. Finally, Finkel suggests that although we may 
refer to small effects as "minimal," it is a bit misleading. Presidential elections are 
often decided on margins of less than three percent. Thus, even a minimal media 
effect can be significant. Certainly, the 2000 Presidential election speaks to the 
wisdom of this point. 
John Zaller (1996) went beyond the traditional criticisms of the minimal 
effects conclusion and suggested that the media may in fact have the "massive 
impact" originally suggested. He concluded that due to problems in measurement 
and research design, the early studies of media impact were unable to discover media 
effects. While Zaller discusses the inadequacies of the cross-sectional approach, his 
critique centers mainly upon the lack of adequate variance in traditional measures of : 
the content of communication to which individuals are exposed. He argues that the 
flow of political communication in the United States is fairly stable over time. 
Therefore, studies of the persuasive effects of the media that rely on typical measures 
of the independent variable are unable to account for the type of variation necessary 
to produce significant effects (see also Hofstetter 1976). He concludes that early 
studies were therefore unable to produce significant results, regardless of the actual 
impact of the media on people's opinions and attitudes (ZaHer 1996). In the end, 
Zaller concludes that "very large campaign effects-effects of mass 
communication-do occur'' (ZaHer 1996: 36). He continues: 
This contribution is, I hope, sufficient to convince my professional peers that, 
in spite of 50 years of mostly null or modest results from research on the 
effects of mass communication, it is stil1 possible that very large media 
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persuasion effects are lurking all around us, waiting to be brought more fuJly 
to light by more appropriate measures. models. and theoretical perspectives. 
Scholars have long viewed media effects as an interaction between citizens 
and the media, ignoring the role of politicians themselves. More recently, Dalton, 
Beck and Huckfeldt (1998), and Just et. al (1996) suggested that campaigns actua11y 
constitute a three part interaction between news media, the public and the politician. 
Dalton. Beck and Huckfeldt look at the flow of information in the 1992 presidential 
election in three parts-media coverage, perception of media coverage by the public, 
and candidate preferences of individuals. Because of differences in circulation and 
traditions of party-based reporting, the authors look at newspapers, as they provide 
more of an opportunity for bias than television or radio news. In the end, Dalton et al. 
(1998) conclude that media coverage of elections doesn't consistently support one 
side or the other. Instead, coverage of elections includes a number of different voices 
and dimensions-- at times positive towards one candidate, at other times positive 
towards the other. Dalton et. al (1998) also find that the tone and content of election 
coverage varies little from one paper to the next. Despite genera11y unbiased 
coverage, partisans are likely to perceive newspaper coverage as biased against their 
preferred candidate. The authors also analyze editorials in newspapers and conclude 
that "political cues provided by editorials have a significant positive effect on 
candidate image even when controlling for partisanship" (122). Furthermore, 
editorial cues are stronger for papers with more consistent partisan cues than for 
newspapers whose party cues were highly variable. Dalton et al's conclusions follow 
closely with the conclusions of Just et al, who suggest that an individuals' public 
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information environment is an important factor in the considerations that one makes 
using this information. 
Best and Hubbard (1999) revisit the question of minimal effects from a 
slightly different perspective. They echo Zaller's concerns about methodological 
inadequacies. In particular, they suggest that techniques used in the past are unable to 
measure proper variance when preferences are anchored by nine months of prior 
information. While not looking specifically at news broadcasts (Best and Hubbard 
look at the effect of televised debates on political behavior), Best and Hubbard 
conclude, "debates possess the capacity to influence viewers' campaign engagement, 
issue appraisals and candidate evaluations" ( 1999:450). In other words, debates 
televised and broadcast through the media have the potential to alter the course of an •; 
election, calling into question once more the logic of the minimal effects model. 
In short, there has been a tremendous amount of debate about whether the 
media have an effect on the opinions, priorities, information and choices of citizens. 
Through an examination of the relevant literature and its evolution, we can conclude: 
(1) Cries of minimal effects were incorrect. 50 years of scholarship has effectively 
debunked the minimal effects hypothesis. (2) The hypodermic effect has likewise, 
been debunked. What citizens view on television isn't magically injected into their 
opinions, priorities and choices. The process of cognition is much more nuanced than 
that. (3) The media do have an effect on individual opinions and choices, particularly 
in elections where citizen information about candidates is less. (4) Even a small 
media impact can be extremely important at election time. The razor thin victory in 
the 2000 Presidential election attests to the importance of small changes in opinion. 
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These findings are vital for our study of media and the state legislature. They 
show conclusively that if legislators use media to influence the opinions, attitudes, 
priorities and choices of citizens, it can work. Some of their message will reach the 
viewer. Although it is not guaranteed, this message may sway a voter or change a 
constituent's mind about an important issue. Likewise, if a legislator uses media 
content as a gauge of public opinion, she can learn from the media they consume. 
While the previous section has given a broad overview of media effects, it 
ignores the key alternatives to the maximum or minimum effects debate-the theories 
of agenda setting, priming and framing. Together with the previous discussion, 
grounding in these theories will demonstrate conclusively that media are important in 
effecting the opinions, priorities and choices of individuals. 
Agenda Setting 
The theory of agenda setting in its purest form posits that the media "may not 
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about" (Cohen 1963: 13). "Agenda-
setting is about the transmission of salience, not the determination of opinions pro and 
con about a particular issue" (McCombs 1997: 433). If the media can set the agenda 
of what people deem as the most important issues in politics and government, this 
knowledge impacts candidate evaluation and as a result, candidate choice and 
preference. Likewise, if politicians can effect media coverage and this in tum affects 
the priorities of citizens, politicians have a direct and productive reason to use the 
media to communicate. 
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Walter Lippman first proposed a notion similar to agenda-setting more than 
50 years ago. He suggested that the media provides people with "pictures in the 
head" (Lippman 1922). The issue lay dormant for a number of years while the 
minimal effects model dominated studies of political communication. In 1972, 
Maxwell Mccombs and Donald Shaw published what would become the seminal 
article in the agenda-setting literature. Mccombs and Shaw ( 1972) conducted a 
cross-sectional study in which they compared the frequency of media mentions of a 
particular issue to the priorities of 100 undecided voters in the Chapel Hill, NC area. 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) discovered an extremely high correlation between the 
salience of the media's agenda and the public's agenda. They concluded from this 
study that the media "set the agenda" for the public. 
While Mccombs and Shaw's study made an immediate splash in the 
academic community and caused many to question the minimal effects conclusion 
that dominated studies of the media and elections; it was not without methodological• 
problems. First, McCombs and Shaw used a limited sample and looked only at a 
cross-section of voters and media stories, providing only a limited snapshot of time, 
not the dynamic process they so boldly claimed (Rogers, Hart and Deering 1997). 
Agenda-setting research soon expanded beyond the rather limited scope of Mccombs 
and Shaw's original study as scholars reconsidered agenda setting using broader and 
more advanced methodological tests. For instance, Funkhouser (1973) examined the 
media agenda for an entire year and compared it to the public's agenda over the same 
time-period. Not to be outdone, Shaw and McCombs later revisited the agenda-
setting hypothesis. In a 1977 study, they used a larger and more representative 
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sample, expanded their definition of media to include both television and newspapers, 
and discarded the cross-sectional design for a more methodologically sophisticated 
panel design. These dramatic changes in technique, however, did not alter the 
conclusion. The agenda-setting hypothesis was once again supported. In the years 
that followed, a number of scholars (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Erbring, Goldenberg and 
Miller 1980; Tipton, Hanry and Baseheart (1975); Weaver, Graber, McCombs and 
Eyal 1981; Winter and Eyal 1981) continued to examine agenda setting using a 
variety of populations while employing a longitudinal design. 
The next major methodological and theoretical step was made by Shanto 
Iyengar and Don Kinder (1987) who revisited the notion of agenda setting (see also 
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). While Maxwell McCombs had earlier remarked 
that "agenda setting may be an apt metaphor, but it is no theory" (1981: 332), Iyengar 
and Kinder (1987) were able to develop the first true theory of agenda-setting. 
Iyengar and Kinder performed 14 laboratory experiments over a number of years to 
see if being exposed to different glimpses of the political world effect individuals' 
perception of that world. While longitudinal designs were a considerable advance 
over the cross-sectional work done by the original generation of agenda setting 
scholars, Iyengar and Kinder's experiment was able to control variables in such a way 
to suggest actual causation, not merely correlation. 
Iyengar and Kinder conclude, ''Television news powerfully influences which 
problems viewers regard as the nation's most serious" (1987: 35). The group who 
had viewed news broadcasts highlighting the environment was much more likely than 
the control group to site the environment as one of the most important issues facing 
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America today. Likewise, those who viewed newscasts with a focus on defense were 
more likely to suggest that the national defense and military strength was one of the 
most important issues facing America today. As McCombs had suggested years 
before, Iyengar and Kinder conclusively demonstrated that television news doesn't 
tell people what to think, it te11s people what to think about. In the words of Iyengar 
and Kinder, "those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news 
become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation's most important" 
(1987:16). 
While Iyengar and Kinder made a significant contribution by corroborating 
the agenda-setting hypothesis, they also took their study farther and examined the 
nature and characteristics of agenda setting. For example, they demonstrated that 
stories that appear earlier in the news broadcast are more likely to affect people's 
beliefs and priorities. Viewers tend to "tune out" news stories at the end of the 
broadcast, understanding the journalistic norm that the most important stories are 
carried early in the broadcast. Accordingly, they are most directly affected by stories 
early in the broadcast. 
Iyengar and Kinder also discovered that the people most susceptible to agenda 
setting are those with little political knowledge. Those with little political knowledge 
are easily swayed and duped into accepting the priorities presented by mass media. 
Political knowledge can combat the agenda setting effect. Those with high levels of 
political knowledge are able to provide a better defense system to protect against the 
transference of journalistic values and priorities to their own. 
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Scholars have also confirmed the agenda-setting hypothesis cross-nationally. 
For example, Hans-Bernd Brosius and Hans Mathias Kepplinger (1990) examined 
agenda setting in Germany for the year 1986. They found that the five most covered 
issues in the news were also the five most important issues to the public as measured 
through weekly public opinion polls, thus supporting the agenda setting hypothesis. 
Takeshita and Mikami (1995) later confirmed the agenda-setting hypothesis in Japan 
while McCombs and Lopez-Escobar demonstrated evidence of the agenda setting in 
parliamentary elections in Mexico (paraphrased from Mccombs and Estrada 1996). 
Semetko and Canel extended the study of agenda setting into elections in Spain's 
1996 elections and once again the hypothesis was corroborated (1997). 
The theory of agenda setting stands in stark-contrast to both the minimal 
effects model and the hypodermic view of media effects. Agenda setting research 
suggests that the media can define the voter's agenda, rather than determine voters' 
opinions. The agenda setting effect has been demonstrated by correlating media 
attention and public opinion. It has been shown using laboratory experiments. It has 
been shown to work cross-nationally. In short, the agenda-setting effect is real. 
An understanding of agenda setting is directly applicable to our understanding 
of the relationship between state legislators and the media. Agenda setting research 
suggests that if a legislator is able to gain media coverage, she will be most successful 
trying to influence her constituents' priorities rather than their mind. For instance, a 
legislator would be more successful using media in the agenda-setting and issue 
definition stages of any campaign. Resources spent trying to change citizens' minds 
could be better spent influencing their priorities. 
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Priming 
Iyengar and Kinder's discussion.of agenda setting also broke new ground in 
their exploration of the priming hypothesis. Through a series of experimental tests, 
Iyengar, Kinder and their scholarly progeny discovered that not only does the media 
affect the agenda of individual citizens, but that this may in turn affect citizens' 
evaluation of various candidates (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar et al. 1984; 
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). While similar, priming and agenda setting are 
distinct concepts with different implications. Simply stated, the priming hypothesis 
suggests that 
When evaluating complex political objects, citizens do not take into account 
all that they know ... what they do consider is what comes to mind, those bits 
and pieces of political memory that are accessible ... by priming certain aspects 
of national life while ignoring others, television news sets the terms by which 
political judgments are rendered and political choices made (Iyengar and 
Kinder 1987:63). 
The foundation of priming suggests that Americans are overloaded with 
information (Graber 1988). Citizens cannot possibly take into account every piece of 
information in their evaluations of politicians and political candidates. Individuals 
are therefore forced to make decisions using only limited information. Most people 
take in only the information they consider "adequate" and make their decision from 
this information. This process is known as "satisficing" (Simon 1957; Simon and 
Stedry 1968). One way to satisfice is to use one or a number of cognitive shortcuts or 
heuristics. One of the most frequently used heuristics, the accessibility heuristic, 
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suggests that people rely upon information that is most accessible in their memory, 
that is, information that comes to mind quickly and easily (Tversky and Kahneman 
1981; Taylor 1982; Pious 1993). Priming relies on this notion of availability and 
suggests that by covering certain stories at the exclusion of others, the media 
"primes" certain aspects of political and social life. When citizens make candidate 
evaluations, it is these primed topics that are immediately available to them. 
Individuals use these primed issues to make judgments about political officials or 
political candidates (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). For example, when primed by 
television news stories on national defense, citizens are more likely to judge the 
president based upon his defense policy. When primed on stories about inflation, 
citizens are more likely to judge the president by his economic policy. 
Whereas agenda setting is a one-stage process (viewing something on the 
media and perceiving it as important), priming is a two-stage process. One must be 
exposed to something in the media, store it in his/her memory and then attach it to a 
related concept. Because the process by which individuals are primed is different 
than agenda setting, priming effects different people than agenda setting. Since 
priming requires people to make the connection between the issue and the president's 
involvement with the issue, the politically unsophisticated are not as susceptible to its 
effects. The politically sophisticated have highly developed schemata that make 
cognitive connections between two concepts much easier (Conover and Feldman 
1984; Lodge, McGraw, Conover and Feldman 1991; Kuklinski et. al 1991; Lodge and 
McGraw 1996). Since the politically sophisticated have the highly developed 
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cognitive structure to make difficult connections, it is the highly developed that 
experience the most dramatic effects of priming. 
Iyengar and Kinder find the implications of priming much more disturbing 
than those of agenda setting. Priming suggests that the politically sophisticated--
those who are politically informed, involved, and influential-- are also susceptible to 
the sway of the media's agenda. Furthermore, priming research demonstrates that 
priming is particularly important in primary elections. "Given the horse race focus of 
most news reports, primary voters are likely to be heavily primed with information 
about the candidates' electability. Voters thus come to favor the candidate that are 
viewed as electable" (Ansolabehere et al. 1993: 177). 
John Krosnick and Don Kinder (1990) corroborate the priming hypothesis by . 
demonstrating that after the disclosure of Iran-Contra, citizens were than twice as 
likely to judge President Reagan on the basis of American intervention in Central 
American than before. Furthermore, Krosnick aild Kinder showed the priming effect: 
was more likely to take place in the judgment of Reagan's political life than in 
assessments of his personal character (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). 
Using the case of George Bush in 1992, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) were 
able to show that when the public was "primed" to think about the Gulf War, 
evaluations of George Bush improved considerably. After the war ended, however, 
the American people were primed by the media to shift their attention from the Gulf 
War to the state of the domestic economy. As they were primed to consider a topic 
where America was faring somewhat worse, evaluations of George Bush declined. 
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Obviously, priming had serious, and possibly fatal effects on George Bush's 
presidential election hopes of 1992 (Krosnick and Brannon 1993). 
The priming effect, although surprisingly under-researched (Geer and Kahn 
1993), has been able to provide us with considerable insight into how media coverage 
affects citizen attitudes and behavior. In brief, the priming research program has 
demonstrated that when the media cover an issue, it not only impacts the priorities of 
the viewer/reader, but this change in priority "primes" the media consumer to alter 
her evaluation of a candidate or politician. This too has an important lesson for our 
understanding of how state legislators use the media. State legislators should only 
seek media coverage on issues that will reflect positively upon them. For instance, if 
a legislator supports an issue that is not popular with her constituency, it would be 
best to ignore this issue in the legislator's dealings with the media. If the media cover 
the issue, the public would most likely evaluate the legislator in the light of the 
issue-something she does not want if it is an unpopular issue. Likewise, if a 
legislator supports an issue that is quite popular with the public, resources would be 
well-spent gaining media coverage on this issue. Also, priming influences the 
political informed more than the uninformed. This is particularly important for 
legislators. It is likely that priming will have the most profound effect on other 
legislators, political elites and informed voters-the audiences primarily important 
when trying to pass policy. 
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Framing 
While both agenda-setting and priming suggest that impact of media on 
individuals can be traced to the frequency of stories, framing suggests that the way a 
story is covered directly effects how people will perceive and respond to an issue 
(Gamson 1992; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Simply stated, 
"Framing is the process by which a communication source constructs and defines a 
social or political issue for its audience" (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997: 221 ). 
Framing research began in social psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). 
Since then, framing has examined by political communication scholars (Iyengar 
1991; Gamson 1992; Gamson and Modiglaiani 1987; Chong 1996). Unfortunately, 
as framing has entered the field of political communication, a number of scholars 
have subsumed the theory of framing within the larger study of persuasion and 
attitude change (Mutz, Sniderman and Brody 1996). This is a mistake. Framing is 
conceptually distinct from persuasion and attitu<hS change as it relies on activating 
information already stored in the recipient's memory rather than providing new 
information as its stimulus for change (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997). 
Work by Shanto Iyengar (1991) showed that episodic frames (frames that 
focus on individual cases) will result in the viewer blaming individuals rather than 
society for the problem or issue in question. In contrast, thematic frames, i.e., those 
that focus on social, political and economic forces) cause individuals to see the 
subject as societally induced, where individuals are less to blame than uncontrollable 
social forces. The way in which individuals view these issues drastically alters the 
evaluations of candidates who are elected to solve these problems. 
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Tom Nelson and his colleagues have looked at a variety of issues in furthering 
development of research in framing. In the first of these, Nelson and Kinder (1996) 
looked at AIDS policy to better understand the dynamics of framing. They 
discovered that frames that focus on the beneficiaries of a particular policy caused 
viewers to tie the issue to the beneficiary and therefore evaluate their view of the 
policy on their opinion of the group in question. 
Next, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley ( 1997) added to the growing body of 
framing literature through their study of media framing of a civil liberties conflict. 
They, conclude that the frame or angle the media takes on controversy directly effects 
citizens perceptions, opinions and actions. The authors suggest that the choice of 
media frames directly effects the "willingness to extend civil liberties protections to 
ignoble and potentially dangerous groups" (1997: 576). 
While the basic framing hypothesis has been corroborated repeatedly, the 
effects of framing on different types of people are somewhat more contested. While 
Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997) suggest that the political sophistication of the 
recipient should have no effect on the effects of framing; more recent studies have 
called this conclusion into question. Goren (1999) found that politically informed 
and aware citizens are more susceptible to media framing and its effects. 
Research has demonstrated that framing is a powerful phenomenon at work in 
American politics. Framing points to the vast impact of the media in shaping today's 
policy opinions. While journalists most likely do not intend to frame issues, (Nelson, 
Oxley and Clawson 1997), framing is still a powerful force. ''These effects may be 
wholly unintended, but they are real nonetheless" (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997). 
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Framing teaches an important lesson to legislators who seek to gain media 
coverage. Media coverage may have unintended consequences. If a journalist (either 
consciously or unconsciously) "frames" a story in a different light that the legislator 
intends, the public reaction may be different than the legislator intends. The alternate 
frame may even cost a legislator her job. In short, framing demonstrates that media 
coverage is not always positive for a legislator. Media coverage may have 
(unintended) negative consequences. Wise state legislators understand that gaining 
media coverage is not without its risks. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that legislators use media to 
influence people's opinions, attitudes and information. What I left unexamined in 
that section, however, was the assumption that people can learn from the media. 
Here, I addressed that assumption. I conclude that people can in fact learn from the 
media. After tremendous scholarly debate, it appears that media content does impact 
people's attitudes, priorities and opinions. In particular, I find that media coverage 
can change the vote choice of a small percentage of the public. The agenda setting 
literature demonstrates conclusively that the media set priorities for the public. The 
priming literature suggests that people evaluate candidates based on their stance on 
the issues covered on the news. Therefore, a legislator who holds a popular position 
on an issue would be well served to see that issue covered on the media. Finally, the 
framing literature suggests that how a story is covered can seriously influence 
people's beliefs on the issue. Next, I move into a discussion of how media tactics 
impact legislative representation in the states. 
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Representation 
State legislators are elected to represent their constituents. Although there is 
tremendous debate about the best means of representation (See, for example, Pitkin 
1967), representation is doubtless a vital component of the American federal system. 
While the term representation encompasses a variety of things, it is best understood 
as: 
... acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them. 
The representative must act independently; his action must involve discretion 
and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be 
(conceived as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being 
taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between 
representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict must not 
normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is 
no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found 
persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in 
terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not 
in accord with their interest (Pitkin 1967: 209-210). 
There is a tremendous amount of literature on representation. Representation 
has been examined in the city council (Eulau and Prewitt 1973), Congress (Fenno 
1978) and of course, in the abstract (Pitkin 1967). Although many studies of state 
legislatures have important implications for representation (e.g. Rosenthal 1981; 
Richardson and Freeman 1995; Freeman and Richardson 1996; Rosenthal 1998) the 
seminal study of representation in the state legislature is undoubtedly Malcolm 
Jewell's classic, Representation in State Legislatures (1982). According to Jewell, 
there are four essential components of representation: communicating with 
constituents, policy responsiveness, allocation of resources for the district, and 
service to constituents. Certainly, every part of this process is essential to 
understanding what interests get represented in the state legislature and why. It is 
outside the scope of this study, however, to examine each of these components in 
depth. Instead, I seek to understand how the media plays a role in this process. 
Specifically, I posit that the media play a key role in the first and second components 
of this process-communicating with constituents, and policy responsiveness. The 
second two components-allocation of resources for the district, and service to 
constituents, can best be understood as the output of this system of representation. 
While the role of the media may play a role determining the output, the media is not 
directly involved in this stage of the process of representation. Below, I review each 
of the four components and specify the role the media plays in each. For the reasons 
discussed previously, I will spend the majority of my time on the first two 
components. 
Communicating With Constituents 
For this type of representation to occur, legislators must be available and 
accessible to their constituents. They must publicize their office hours, phone 
numbers, e-mails addresses, etc. They must tell constituents how they voted and 
why. They must convince their constituents that they are serving their interests. In 
short, just as members of Congress must explain Washington activity (Fenno 1978), 
state legislators must explain state capital activity. This can be done in a number of 
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ways. For example, many legislators send out newsletters to their constituents. 
Others send other forms of direct mail, while some send out mass e-mails. Still 
others engage in old-style retail politics-what used to be known as "pressing the 
flesh." While none of these methods can be ignored, I am most interested in 
legislators seeking, courting and getting media coverage. This may be accomplished 
in many ways. A legislator may write editorials, stage a "psuedo-event" (Boorstein 
1962), appear on public access cable, or purchase advertising space. Finally, a 
legislator may contact reporters and journalists. In short, legislators may engage in 
the "negotiation of newsworthiness" that Timothy Cook finds so prevalent in the 
United States Congress ( 1989; 1998). Regardless of the form it takes, media exposure 
allows a legislator to communicate with a large number of constituents at one time. 
The cost is generally low and the pay off is often substantial. Still, there is risk in this 
mode of communication. Legislators do not have total control over the final product 
and journalists may impose their own opinions on the story. In short, the story may 
not come out favorably for the legislator. Still, mere mention in the news can often 
do wonders for a legislator's electoral hopes.2 Unfortunately, we know little else 
about how state legislators use the media in this capacity. While many have 
suggested that media play a role (Jewell 1982; Rosenthal 1998), no one knows 
exactly how. In chapter 3, I address this question. 
Policy Responsiveness 
The second component of representation refers to the congruence between 
constituent opinion and legislator action. Alongside casework, acquisition of 
2 For instance, Brady and Theriault (2000) find that each mention in the New York Times translates to 
a $3000 increase in a Senator's campaign coffers 
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resources and the projection of concern, policy congruence is one part of the 
representative-constituency linkage (Rosenthal 1998: 11 ). Generally speaking, a 
legislator is considered responsive on policy issues if her views and voting behavior 
are consistently aligned with the opinions expressed by her constituents (see for 
example, Poole and Rosenthal 1991). Unfortunately, there is no sure-fire way to 
"know" the opinions of constituents. If a legislator miscalculates what constituent 
opinion is on an issue, she may vote or act in a way incongruent with the wishes of 
their constituents. This may have dire electoral consequences. In order to be 
responsive and avoid electoral defeat, legislators use a number of different tactics to 
gauge constituent opinion. 
First, a legislator can conduct public opinion pons. This is a fairly 
straightforward way to know constituent opinion. Essentially, this requires the 
legislator or member of the legislative staff to construct a survey instrument asking a 
number of questions on various policy issues. The survey instrument is then mailed · 
to constituents who are instructed to mail the survey back3• Alternatively, the survey 
may be administered by telephone. While this may be gaining prominence as a way 
of knowing public opinion, it is still fraught with problems. First, legislators often 
have difficulty obtaining an adequate response rate (Jewell 1982). Second, many 
legislators question the accuracy of public opinion polls. Even if a legislator is 
convinced the polJ was administered properly and its results are accurate, the results 
are still time-bound. In other words, the picture of public opinion provided in a 
3 This may be aimed at the entire district, or may instead seek the opinions of a specific constituency. 
As Fenno (1978) found, legislators react to and are concerned with the opinion of various constituency 
to varying degrees. 
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survey or poll may be due to a temporary condition or occurrence. Third, and most 
importantly, properly conducted public opinion polls are extremely expensive. Often, 
a legislator may have little money to spend on finding out what public opinion is on 
an issue. For these reasons, the use of surveys and polls to know constituent opinion 
is used very infrequently (Herbst 1998). 
The second way a legislator may know public opinion is through organized 
interests. In her study of the Illinois state legislature, Susan Herbst ( 1998) found that 
legislative staff members often use the communications of organized interests as a 
proxy for public opinion. While a number of factors may account for this reliance on 
organized interest opinion, Herbst suggests that it is primarily because they 
communicate clearly and efficiently, they are considered honest, and they can often 
communicate the intensity of opinion on any given issue. Moreover, lobbyists are 
extremely well informed about their issues, and understand what legislators want to 
know and in what form they want to know it. According to Herbst, ''They [organized 
interests] translate opinion, but during this translation process they also help to give 
public opinion a more solid and comprehensible form. Lobbyists are perceived to 
crystallize or clarify the content and intensity of vague public moods" (Herbst 1998: 
53). 
Third, a legislator may use phone calls received from constituents as an 
indicator of public opinion. This too may be fraught with problems. Legislators have 
no way of knowing whether the opinions expressed through phone calls accurately 
reflect the opinion of the district in general, or the opinions of a few individuals. 
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Generally speaking, phone calls are discounted as a way to know district opinion or 
public opinion in general (Herbst 1998). 
Fourth, and most importantly for this study, legislators often use media 
content as a means of learning about public opinion. Many respondents in Herbst's 
study, expressed the belief that "mass media content is public opinion" (1998: 64). 
According to Herbst, "AH [of the staffers interviewed] believed that newspaper, 
television or radio content was not simply a conduit for public opinion express: in 
their view, it is the very essence of public opinion and can support or destroy 
legislative initiatives" (Herbst 1998: 65). As state legislatures become more 
professional (King 2000) and legislators spend more time in the state capital, many 
legislators must rely on media content as a surrogate for public opinion. Certainly, 
this places a heavy burden on statehouse journalists-individuals not elected by the 
people. While Herbst's study has suggested that this occurs, we know little about the 
ways in which it occurs. Chapter 4 addresses this issue. 
Allocation of Resources For District and Service To Constituents 
The last two components of legislative representation are the output of 
legislative representation. Simply stated, they are the "stuff' of politics. Providing 
resources and service for constituents is how legislators keep their jobs. If they 
become known as adept in this respect, they may stay in office for decades. If they 
are unable to "bring home the bacon," they may quickly be looking for new 
employment. While the media do not play a direct role in the output itself, they do 
play a significant role in determining what the outcome is. Interest in the process 
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leading up to the allocation of resources and services to constituents is what drives 
this study. 
Figure 2 depicts the process of representation in the states. To summarize, 
representation consists of: communicating with constituents, policy responsiveness, 
allocation of resources for the district, and service to constituents (Jewell 1982). 
While each and every component of legislative representation is vitally important, I 
address only those that relate specifically to the media-communicating with 
constituents and policy responsiveness. There are a number of ways of 
communicating with constituents, including through direct mail, through retail 
politics, and through newsletters. Although all of these means of communicating 
with constituents are important, I am only concerned with how legislators use the 
media to communicate with constituents. Likewise, there are a number of ways for 
legislators to achieve policy responsiveness. I am only concerned with how 
legislators use media content to "know public opinion" and achieve policy 
responsiveness. While this narrow focus does not give us a complete understanding 
of representation, it does give us a more complete understanding of the role of the 
media in the process of representation. This is turn illuminates parts of the puzzle of 
representation in the states. Future studies examining the changing nature of 
representation in the states should use the results obtained here in placing the media 
in this larger framework of representation. 
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Alan Rosenthal and the Changing Nature of Legislative Representation in the States 
The question remains, how is representation changing in the states? Alan 
Rosenthal suggests that there has been a tremendous change in the nature of 
representation in state legislatures. While the country was founded to value the 
republican principle of representative democracy, Rosenthal argues that in recent 
years we have moved away from this ideal and towards a more participatory 
democracy. Most importantly for this dissertation, Rosenthal suggests that this 
"decline in representative democracy" is largely a function of the rise in the use of 
polling, constituency contact and media tactics by state legislatures. This has a 
number of deleterious effects including the danger of manipulation, the danger of less 
deliberation and the weakening of the state legislature. According to Rosenthal, this 
could lead to a system of governance where governors have increasing and 
overwhelming power. This "unchecked power" is certainly contrary to the wishes of 
Madison, Hamilton and the like. 
In sum, Rosenthal suggests that media tactics along with other means of 
achieving legislative goals have resulted in a decline of representative democracy. 
Unfortunately, Rosenthal provides little data to demonstrate whether legislators use 
media tactics, much less which legislators use media tactics. Hopefully my results 
can help inform Rosenthal's discussion and thus impact our understanding of the 
changing nature of representation in the states. 
Conclusion 
From this chapter we now know that the media can be used to achieve reelection, 
good public policy and power inside the legislature. Next, we know that using the 
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media for these purposes is potentially fruitful. Finally, we know that like most 
studies of legislative behavior, this study has implications for representation. Indeed, 
if legislators use media, the traditional definitions of representation may no longer 
apply as there are well-established biases built into the process of newsgathering and 
newsmaking. These biases may severely alter the message being communicated from 
legislator to citizen and vice-versa. 
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CHAPTER III: 
THE MEDIA ENTERPRISE IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE 
In previous chapters, I established that in order to better understand how legislators 
attain their legislative goals of reelection, good public policy and power within the 
legislature, we must obtain a better understanding of how state legislators and the 
media interact. In this chapter I begin to review my findings about this relationship. 
First, I discuss the questions and hypotheses that guide the analysis in this chapter. 
Then, I review the findings. Finally, I discuss the conclusions of this chapter and 
discuss implications for our understanding of both state legislatures and political 
communication. 
Questions and Hypotheses 
I seek to answer a number of questions regarding the relationship between state 
legislators and the media. First, I ask the most basic question: do state legislators use 
media tactics? Although a few studies suggest that the answer is yes (Fico 1984; 
Lynch 1999), the studies that ask this question generally examine only one legislature 
and are quite dated. The question certainly deserves to be revisited. Next, I seek to 
find out how state legislators and members of Congress differ in their use of media 
tactics. I use Kedrowski's (1996) typology of media entrepreneurship to answer this 
question. Considering that members of Congress are covered more often than state 
legislators and have much larger press offices, I hypothesize that fewer state 
legislators are media entrepreneurs than members of Congress. 
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I also seek to find out how media tactics compare to more traditional means of 
legislating. In particular I ask how frequently legislators engage in media tactics 
(appearing on television news, writing op-eds, issuing press releases, and appearing 
on public access television) as opposed to traditional means of legislating (contacting 
other legislators directly, proposing legislation, contacting government agencies, 
contacting governor's office, speaking on the floor, meeting with lobbyists and 
meeting with the party caucus). I also ask, how effective do legislators consider the 
above activities? In other words, are the tactics legislators use the same as the ones 
they feel are most effective? 
Our understanding of the media-state legislature relationship would be 
incomplete without asking whom state legislators seek to reach with their media 
strategies. Some scholars have suggested that legislators often use the media to reach 
other legislators and members of the po1icy community (Kedrowski 1996), while 
others suggest they aim only to reach constituents with their media efforts (Hess 
1991). I will weigh in on this debate in the state legislature. 
Next, I ask: Who uses the media? In other words, what factors predict 
whether a legislator perceives media as a useful and effective outlet for their 
resources? I include eight independent variables to examine this relationship: gender, 
age, majority party/minority party, chamber, leadership, electoral vulnerability, media 
market congruence, and state. I also employ each of the above variables in a model 
predicting the frequency with which a legislator will use media tactics. Although I 
would hypothesize that the same factors would predict both effectiveness and 
frequency, no studies have compared how effective legislators view media tactics to 
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how often they engage in the same activities. In other words, I would expect that if a 
legislator feels a certain media tactic is effective, she would also be more likely to use 
that same tactic. Below, I review each independent variable, its hypothesized 
relationship to a legislator's use of the media, as well and how each independent 
variable is coded. 
Independent Variables 
State. One advantage of studying state legislatures is that they provide a 
number of different institutional contexts to test theories and hypotheses. In this 
study, I examine the media activities and attitudes of legislators in California, Georgia 
and Iowa. These legislatures vary on a number of different dimensions. For 
example, California state legislators are more professional and have more resources at 
their disposal. Each California legislator also represents far more people than does 
each legislator in Georgia and Iowa. For these reasons, I hypothesize that California 
state legislators are more apt to use the media than legislators in Georgia and Iowa. I 
include a dummy variable for California (l= California legislator; O= not California 
legislator) and a dummy variable for Georgia (!=Georgia legislator; O= not Georgia 
legislator). 
Gender. Unfortunately, few studies examine how female politicians are 
covered once they are elected (Carroll and Schreiber 1997). Those studies that have 
addressed the issue suggest that stories about women often focus on trivial issues 
(Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994). When they do cover policy, they tend to cover 
traditional "women's issues" such as health and abortion and ignore other policy 
issues where women may be influential (Carroll and Schreiber 1997). Although not 
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directly related to the issue of how female officer holders are covered by media, 
scholars have also established that female candidates are covered less often than male 
candidates when running for office. When women are covered, stories tend to focus 
more on their viability as candidates than on issues or substantive policy positions 
(Kahn 1994; Kahn 1996; Kahn and Goldberg 1991). In sum, the available research 
suggests that coverage of female politicians is generally less frequent and less 
substantive than coverage of male politicians. From this, I hypothesize that women 
will use media tactics less frequently than their male counterparts. This is a 
dichotomous variable (l=male, 0=female). 
Age. There is often a picture of media entrepreneurs as predominately young 
legislators. Kedrowski concludes that, "Media entrepreneurs are younger, but not 
necessarily junior members of Congress" (Kedrowski 1996: 50). In a partially 
contradictory finding, Stephen Hess (1986) concluded that the Senators who receive 
the most coverage are "fast approaching sixty years of age and are in their third 
term ... " (1986:29). Hess does note, however, that his finding is probably more a 
function of tenure than age. I seek to find if whether age is a significant factor in 
predicting a state legislator's attitude towards the media. Here I hypothesize that, 
controlling for other factors, younger legislators will be more likely to be media 
entrepreneurs. Instead of creating a continuous variable with a value for each age, I 
divided each legislator's age into one of four categories (1=65 & older; 2= 50-64; 3= 
34-49; 4= below 34). 
Majority party/ Minority party. Cook (1989), and Kedrowski (1996) found 
that legislators often use the media as a means to impact the legislative agenda while 
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circumventing formal channels. In other words, using the media may provide 
members of the minority party with a way to influence legislation regardless of 
whether their party is in power. Considering these findings, I hypothesize that state 
legislators who are a member of the minority party are more likely to use the media 
than legislators who are members of the majority party. This is a dichotomous 
variable (!=majority party; 0= minority party). 
Leadership. Newscasts and newspapers have limited time and space to devote 
to government news coverage. As a result, certain legislators are generally 
considered more newsworthy than others. Stephen Hess (1986) concluded that 
among those who are more newsworthy are senators who occupy leadership 
positions. These senators are more visible and lend credibility to discussion of issues 
under their purview. Keeping with these findings, I hypothesize that members of the 
leadership will be more likely to use media and feel positively inclined towards media 
relations than members not in leadership. Leadership is a dichotomous variable 
(!=legislative or party leader; 0= not a legislative or party leader). 
Media Market Congruence. "Media market congruence refers to the degree of 
overlap between a television market and a legislative district" (Hogan 1997: 557). 
This has been used to predict mass media advertising (Hogan 1997), and constituent 
knowledge of representatives (Campbell, Alford and Henry 1984; Lipinski 2001). 
Each legislative district was given a score of congruence ranging from 1-100. A 
score of 1 signifies that the district does not line up well with the media market. A 
score of 100 would suggest that the media market and legislative district have 
identical boundaries. For the media market information, I relied on the Broadcasting 
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and Cable Yearbook. For details on how to create the congruence score, see Hogan 
(1997), and Campbell, Alford and Henry (1984). While this does not measure the 
level of congruence between state legislative districts and print media markets, it does 
provide a rough estimate, as generally print and electronic media markets are similar. 
I hypothesize that legislators whose districts are highly congruent with the media 
market will find it easier to gamer media coverage and thus will engage in media 
tactics more often. Likewise, if a legislator's district crosses into a number of 
different media markets and is thus incongruent, she will likely see the media as a less 
effective and less efficient means of reaching constituents than if her district is 
contained within one media market. 
Electoral Vulnerability. Undoubtedly, reelection is one major reason legislators (and 
all politicians, for that matter) use media tactics. Given this, if a legislator is coming 
off of a tight race, she should be more likely to use media tactics to communicate 
with her constituents on a regular basis. This variable is measured as the percent of 
the vote the legislator received in the last election in which she ran. I gathered this 
information from the web sites for the California, Georgia and Iowa boards of 
elections. 
Results 
It is often assumed that media strategies are an increasingly important part of 
legislative behavior in the states. Alan Rosenthal recently stated, ''The urge to play to 
the media is practically irresistible" (1998: 109). The following section will assess the 
validity of this statement and describe what factors affect whether a state legislator is 
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an active "media entrepreneur" (Kedrowski 1996) or a low-profile member who 
shirks media and public relations tactics for more traditional methods of legislating. 
The first four questions of the survey ask how legislators feel about using the 
media in the policy process. Table 4 shows the results of these questions. The data 
suggest that state legislators have a generally positive attitude toward the use of 
media strategies. For example, over half of the respondents either strongly agree or 
agree that state legislators often solicit media exposure; that soliciting media exposure 
is a particularly effective way of putting an issue on the legislative agenda; that media 
exposure is an effective way to convince other legislators to support policy proposals; 
and that media exposure is an effective way to stimulate discussion on policy 
alternatives. Combined, these results suggest that state legislators, like their 
congressional counterparts, often use media strategies as a tool for legislating. These 
data also paint a clear picture of differences between states. California state 
legislators agree and strongly agree with these statements much more often than their., 
counterparts in Georgia and Iowa. Most remarkably, 100% of the California 
legislators who responded to the survey indicated that members often solicit media 
exposure as a way to stimulate discussion about policy proposals. While the media 
seem to be players in legislative politics in all three states surveyed, media tactics 
seem to be most pervasive in California. 
On the basis of their responses to the first four questions, respondents were 
then placed into one of four categories: traditional legislators, pool of potential media 
entrepreneurs, likely media entrepreneurs, and hard-core media entrepreneurs. The 
categories and scoring that corresponds to each category are consistent with 
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Kedrowski 's ( 1996) study of the media and Congress. The pool of media 
entrepreneurs consists of legislators whose average responses to the first four 
questions score 4.0 or higher (on a five point scale). Although Kedrowski's (1996) 
survey is geared towards legislative staff, I believe this comparison is warranted. 
First, Kedrowski instructs her respondents to answer in relation to the legislator's 
opinion and the legislator's activity. Second, as she notes, "almost without exception, 
staff mirror the member's philosophy, approach, and values" (1996:18). Although 
not a perfect comparison, my survey questions are virtually identical to those posed 
by Kedrowski. Furthermore, Kedrowski's data are some of the only data available 
for comparison. Comparing these scores can give us a unique look at the differences 
between media tactics of state legislators as opposed to the media tactics employed in 
Congress. Likely media entrepreneurs were labeled as those legislators who scored 
4.25 and above, while hard-core media entrepreneurs are defined as those who 
average a response score of 4.5 and above. By combining the first four questions of 
the survey and developing a scale of "attitude toward using the media," I find that 
state legislators have similar but slightly less positive attitudes towards using media 
than members of Congress. While 49 percent of state legislators are potential media 
entrepreneurs, 53.6 percent of members of Congress can be categorized as such 
(Kedrowski 1996). Likely media entrepreneurs make up 25 percent of state 
legislators surveyed, compared with 28.5 percent of members of Congress 
(Kedrowski 1996). Finally, 19 percent of state legislators are categorized as hard-
core media entrepreneurs compared to 22 percent of members of Congress 
(Kedrowski 1996). Together, these findings suggest that state legislators have a 
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generaJly positive attitude towards using the media to further their policy goals, but 
are still less positive than their congressional ~ounterparts. With the proliferation of 
media as a source for political knowledge, it is not surprising that state legislators rate 
the media as an effective way to further their policy goals. Samuel Kernell (1986) 
suggests that when political institutions become more individualized, the members 
are more likely to engage in media strategies. Obviously, the state legislature is a 
much Jess individualized body than Congress. Far fewer citizens can identify their 
state legislator than their member of Congress (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Thus, 
it stands to reason that although state legislators do use the media, they are less likely 
to use media strategies than their congressional counterparts 
Types of Media Activities 
Certain activities require a legislator to expend tremendous resources and undertake 
great risk, while others involve little effort and risk. This section addresses how often 
state legislators engage in specific media activities. Likewise, I compare the 
frequency of individual media activities to more traditional means of legislating. 
Each legislator was asked two questions about media tactics (including: 
writing op-ed articles, appearing on television programs, issuing press releases, and 
appearing on public access television) and traditional modes of legislating (including: 
contacting other legislators directly, proposing legislation, contacting government 
agencies, contacting the governor's office, speaking on the floor, meeting with 
lobbyists, and meeting with the party caucus). For each tactic, the respondent was 
asked to indicate how frequently she engages in that activity as wen as how effective 
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she believes that activity to be. Responses for the frequency questions were coded as 
follows: 
4= The legislator frequently engages in that activity. 
3= The legislator engages in that activity occasionally. 
2= The legislator rarely engages in that activity. 
1= The legislator never engages in that particular activity. 
The results are displayed in Table 5. 
I find that traditional means of legislating are still the most popular. 
Legislators claim they contact other legislators, meet with lobbyists, meet with their 
party's caucus, and propose legislation more often than they engage in any media 
activity. Not surprisingly, issuing press releases is the most frequently utilized media 
activity. State legislators issue press releases more often than they engage in some 
traditional modes of legislating, including speaking on the floor and contacting the 
governor's office. Writing op-ed articles appears next, followed by appearing on 
television news, and appearing on public access cable. In short, although state 
legislators engage in media activities, these activities are still less prevalent than more 
traditional means of legislating. This is consistent with the literature on media and 
Congress, which suggests that while media activities are increasingly important to 
politicians (Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999), they are not used at the expense of more 
traditional activities (Kedrowski 1996). 
When comparing the results from each state, we once again get the picture 
that California state legislators are more media savvy than their counterparts in Iowa 
and Georgia. In particular, California legislators claim they appear on televised 
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media and public access television more often than Iowa or Georgia legislators. This 
is somewhat surprising considering the size of many of California's media markets. 
It is much more difficult to attract the attention of television and newspapers in large 
media markets such as Los Angeles and San Francisco. 
While the above discussion gives an overview of how frequently legislators in 
various states use media tactics, it does not discuss whether legislators believe these 
tactics are effective. Legislators were also asked about the effectiveness of the same 
activities as discussed above. Responses were coded as follows: 
4= The legislator rates the activity as very effective. 
3= The legislator rates the activity as effective. 
2= The legislator rates the activity as somewhat effective. 
I= The legislator rates the activity as not effective. 
Average results are displayed in Table 6. 
Legislators indicate that writing op-eds, and appearing on public access 
television are the most effective media tactics. Legislators believe that these two 
tactics are more effective than most traditional tactics of legislating. This stands in 
stark contrast to the data regarding the frequency of media usage. For instance, while 
state legislators engage in most traditional means of legislating more than media 
tactics, they generally see media tactics as being more effective than their traditional 
counterparts. There are a number of possible explanations for this disconnect. First, 
it is entirely possible that legislators wish to use media more often, but they simply do 
not have the resources. The data seem to back up this conclusion. California 
legislators generally see media tactics as no more effective than do their counterparts 
69 
in Georgia and Iowa. Nonetheless, they engage in media activities more often. 
While it is possible that California media are simply more apt to cover state politics 
and state politicians, this would conflict with the majority of the literature on media 
and politics which suggests that media outlets display similar news-gathering routines 
and vary little in the types of stories they cover. 
Whom Are Legislators Trying to Reach With Their Media Strategies? 
This paper has shown that state legislators do in fact engage in media activities, but 
engage in these activities less than traditional forms of legislating. My next research 
question asks: Whom are state legislators trying to reach with their media efforts? To 
address this question, I asked respondents the following question, "Many members of 
the state legislature use strategies such as writing op-ed articles and conducting 
interviews with reporters to publicize their ideas and policy positions. In your 
opinion, whom are these members trying to reach through these efforts? Check all 
that apply." The results of this question are displayed in Figure 3. 
Not surprisingly, the bulk of media efforts are aimed at a legislator's 
constituency. As one legislator commented, "the main purpose of the media for state 
legislators is to inform constituents of issues and results of actions." Interest groups 
and the public outside the constituency are next. It appears that state legislators also 
attempt to reach other legislators with their media activities. Over half of all 
respondents indicated that their media efforts are at least partly aimed at other 
legislators, both in their party and in the other party. Party leaders and officials in the 
Governor's office are next. In addition, over 36 percent of respondents indicate that 
one of their target audiences for media activities is other media. This is consistent 
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with the conclusions of congressional scholars who suggest that members of 
Congress often aim their media activities at other media, thus spawning increased 
coverage and more publicity (Kedrowski 1996). 
These data show first and foremost that state legislators aim to reach 
constituents with their media activities. The story does not end here, however. 
Legislators may also engage in media activities to reach a variety of audiences, 
primarily in the capital community. While Stephen Hess (1986) contends that most 
legislators shun using media activities to reach the capital community, this conclusion 
does not appear to apply in the state legislature. Legislators' media activities may be 
aimed primarily at their constituents, but they also clearly wish to reach other 
legislators and other policy elites. Indeed, the data suggest that media are used to 
reach a variety of audiences. While constituents may be the largest intended 
audience, they are not the only one. Future studies should recognize this. 
Which Legislators Use Media Tactics? 
Using Ordinary Least Squares regression, I next examine what factors determine how 
effective legislators believes media tactics will be, as well as how frequently they use 
those tactics. Please see Appendix C for a description of Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. Separate models were run for questions asking legislators about 
frequency as well as effectiveness. Models were also run for all states together, as 
well as for each state individually. To create the variable for models referring to 
frequency, I combined answers to a question stating, "Legislators may engage in a 
variety of activities in order to achieve their policy goals. Please indicate how often 
you engage in each of the following activities." The dependent variable for the 
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questions asking about effectiveness is the combined results from a question asking 
"In your opinion, what is the relative effectiveness of each of the following activities 
for furthering your policy goals?" The results of both are displayed in Table 7. 
The data presented in Table 7 support a resource definition of media usage. It 
appears that legislators who have more resources will use media tactics more often. 
In the clearest demonstration of this, it appears that California legislators are more 
likely to engage in media tactics, but are no more likely than other legislators to 
believe that their media activities are effective. California legislators have more staff, 
are in session longer, and have more money to spend on media activities. Their 
increased experience with the media does not appear to cause them to see these 
strategies as more effective than legislators in other states who may engage in the 
media enterprise less often. This suggests that it is in fact the availability of 
resources, rather than differences in perceived effectiveness that result in more or less 
frequent use of the media. This stands in contrast to previous work in political 
communication that suggests that legislators use media as a way to compensate for a 
large gap between expectations and resources (Cook 1998). Lending extra credence 
to this resource definition of media use is the fact that the media market variable is 
not significant in any of the models. It thus seems to be the resources afforded 
California legislators, rather than the congruence of media markets that determines 
the frequency with which state legislators use media tactics. 
Leadership is not significant in any of the models. This is surprising 
considering the findings of congressional scholars that leadership is an important 
variable in predicting media entrepreneurship (Kedrowski 1996) and frequency of 
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media coverage (Theriault and Brady 2000). When one considers the nature of 
legislative leadership in the states, it becomes less surprising, however. There are 
many more leadership positions in the state legislature than in Congress (Rosenthal 
1998). While oftentimes these leadership positions entail little more than an official 
title, the sheer number of legislative leaders makes each individual leader much less 
newsworthy. 
While gender is not a significant predictor of how often a legislator will 
engage in specific media activities, it appears that female state legislators are more 
likely than males to perceive media activities as effective. While this relationship is 
significant for all states, it is not significant for any of the three states considered 
alone. Nonetheless, the direction of the relationship is consistent for all three states. 
By breaking up the data by type of media activity, it appears that female legislators 
find issuing press releases, appearing on public access television and appearing on 
network television more effective than other types of media activities. It appears that 
female legislators have chosen modes of media relations that give them more control. 
Legislators have more control over the tone, content, and presentation on public 
access television than in other media outlets. Likewise, a legislator would likely have 
more control over his appearance on a network television program than they would 
over their appearance on other forms of media. Finally, press releases are a 
legislator's best attempt to "spin" a news story a certain way. Even if taken out of 
context, it is unlikely that a press release could hurt a state legislator. In sum, it 
appears that the media tactics women find most effective are the ones they have most 
control over. 
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Once the models are broken up by state, few patterns appear. Urban is 
negatively significant for the California effectiveness model, but for no other models. 
Age is significant for the Georgia frequency model, but for no others. In all, it 
appears that when one controls for resources, little else can adequately predict how 
frequently state legislators use media tactics, or how they feel about their 
effectiveness. These data provide a unique and intuitively appealing way to look at 
how often legislators engage in media activities that cannot be seen in cross-sectional 
data of Congress. By looking at different state contexts and contro11ing for alternative 
causes, we see a picture of media usage that suggests simply: as resources rise, 
legislators' use of media tactics will also rise. Certainly, this hypothesis deserves to 
be revisited in future studies. In particular, scholars should test this hypothesis using 
more states. The supreme importance of resources also suggests that as states 
continue to professionalize (King 2000), legislators will increase their use of media 
tactics. 
When Do State Legislators Use Media Tactics? 
We have demonstrated conclusively that legislators use the media first and foremost 
to communicate with constituents. Not to be discounted, however, is the finding that 
legislators also use the media to communicate with a variety of other audiences. This 
section will discuss in further detail when state legislators use the media to affect the 
policy process. Certainly, agenda setting provides the most obvious place for 
legislators to attempt to affect the process by utilizing media strategies. Indeed, the 
power to control what alternatives are under consideration is the most important 
"face" of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1972). Agenda setting also marks the place in 
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the policy process where people's opinions are most malleable. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, when individuals are exposed to stories on the media, they are more likely 
to believe those stories are important (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Agenda setting thus 
provides a logical place for legislators to use the media. The following section will 
try to find out if this is the only place in the policy process where state legislators use 
the media. 
Each legislator was asked, ''The media may be used at various stages in the 
legislative process. How often do you solicit media attention for each of the 
following stages of the policy process (4=Frequently; 3=0ccasionally, 2=Rarely, 
!=Never)?" The results are displayed in Table 8. 
The results are fairly surprising. While legislators are most likely to use 
media in the agenda setting stage of the policy process ("to raise awareness of a 
problem; to place an item on the agenda") (mean=2.9), they are almost as likely to 
use the media in other stages of the policy process. There is little deviation between 
each of the response categories. The mean score deviates by less than half a point 
(.43) from the highest to the lowest response category. Furthermore, the categories 
each have a median score of 3. The similar scores for each category suggested that 
that legislators do not make much differentiation between using the media enterprise 
at each of the different stages of the policy process. 
These data suggest that legislators who use the media in the policy process 
will utilize the media enterprise at virtually any stage of the policy process. Despite 
evidence that affecting the process is much more difficult after the agenda is set and 
the alternatives are defined (Kedrowski 1996), legislators seem to be equally apt to 
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use the media to move a bill through the committee as define the agenda. Two 
explanations emerge as plausible. 
The first explanation suggests that the policy process is not a linear set of 
steps such as I have presented. Legislators do not differentiate between the various 
states of the policy process. Under this view, the data support a "garbage can" model 
of the policy process. This model is based on the assumption that the policy process 
is fraught with ambiguity. According to Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), decision-
making in complex organizations is not predictable and linear, but instead can best be 
understood as taking place in "organized anarchies" where decisions in these 
"organized anarchies" are not made as a function of clearly delineated processes, but 
rather by a confluence of four streams. The first of these streams is a problem stream, 
containing all possible problems in the universe of the organization. The second is a 
potential solution stream, containing ideas an organization proposes or things they 
want done. These may or may not have a specific problem associated with them. 
Third is a stream of participants. The fourth stream is a stream of choice 
opportunities that may bring together solutions with problems. These four streams 
are always flowing, when they happen to meet, a decision may occur. If they meet in 
the proper place at the proper time, a "good" decision may occur. Under a garbage 
can model, legislators make little distinction between various "stages" of the policy 
process. Indeed, some stages may exist in some policy domains, and may not exist in 
another. Likewise, the order of these stages may vary drastically for different 
policies. In a garbage can model, legislators would not use the media to varying 
degrees in different stages because they do not see the distinction between these 
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stages. Instead, the use of media tactics in the policy process is a much less 
predictable, planned process and is much mo~ uneven and opportunistic. 
A second, and not incompatible explanation suggests that either legislators do 
or do not have the resources to expend on media strategies. Legislators have 
available resources do consistently use the media in the policy process, regardless of 
the circumstances, while those who do not have the proper resources at their disposal 
avoid the media enterprise. This .. resource definition of media usage" does not 
depend on a legislator to feel that the practice will be particularly useful for them to 
use the media enterprise. Rather, if they have the resources at their disposal, they will 
use them. 
What Have We Learned? 
This chapter begins to shed light on an understudied aspect of legislative behavior-
how and why state legislators use media tactics. It has produced a number of key 
findings. First, the data suggest that media tactics are important in state legislatures,.: 
although not as important as they are in Congress. Although legislators may use the 
media in electoral situations (Hogan 1997), using the media is not a completely 
electoral enterprise. State legislators also use the media to further their policy goals 
by reaching constituents, policy elites and other media. 
Most importantly, I find that just because a legislator finds media tactics 
effective, she will not necessarily use them. Controlling for other possible causes, it 
appears that legislators who have more resources at their disposal will use media 
tactics more often, while those with less resources will use media tactics less 
frequently. This has important implications for our understanding of media and 
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politics. It appears that "the urge to play to the media is practically irresistible" 
(Rosenthal 1998: 109), only if a legislator is given the proper institutional support. 
As state legislators continue to become more professional, I expect that their use of 
media tactics wi11 increase. While this could increase constituent knowledge of their 
legislator, it can also have deleterious effects. In particular, Alan Rosenthal suggests 
that the increasing use of the media by state legislators is one indication of a larger 
"decline of representative democracy." My findings suggest that Rosenthal's fears 
will become increasingly salient. 
Next, I find that while state legislators do indeed engage in media activities, 
traditional forms of legislating are still more prevalent. It appears that the use of 
media strategies augments rather than replaces a legislator's "bag of legislative 
tricks." Among media activities and strategies, issuing press releases is the most 
popular. Media activities that require more time and resources are generally avoided 
in deference to those that require expending fewer resources. The data also suggest 
that state legislators direct the majority of their media activities at their constituents. 
This does not tell the entire story, however. Over half of the respondents stated that 
they also seek to reach other legislators both in their own party as well as the 
opposing party. Interest groups, as well as the public outside of their constituency, 
are also prime targets of media activities. The traditional belief that legislators are 
only concerned with reaching constituents with their media tactics appears to be false. 
State legislators have a variety of audiences in mind for their media tactics. Studies 
that focus solely on constituent media relations provide a rather shortsighted view of 
media strategies. Future studies should recognize this and continue to examine how 
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state legislators use media to communicate with a variety of audiences. Finally, 
despite the assumptions of other legislative scholars (Cook 1988; Keclrowski 1996), 
state legislators are no more Jikely to use the media to set the agenda and define 
alternatives than they are in other stages of the poJicy process. 
Implications For Representation 
Chapter 2 established that in order to fully understand representation in the states, we 
must gain a better understanding of how state legislators interact with the media. 
This chapter has shed some light on this issue. Specifically, we have learned more 
about one specific component of legislative representation-communicating with 
constituents. It seems that state legislators use the media as one way to communicate 
with constituents. Although there are a number of different ways to gain media 
coverage, legislators make use of press releases most often. 
This study begins to shed light on an understudied aspect of legislative 
behavior-how and why state legislators use media tactics. It has produced a number:, 
of key findings. First, the data suggest that media tactics are important in state 
legislatures, although not as important as they are in Congress. Although legislators 
may use the media in electoral situations (Hogan 1997), using the media is not a 
completely electoral enterprise. State legislators also use the media to further their 
policy goals by reaching constituents, policy elites and other media. 
Most importantly, I find that just because a legislator finds media tactics 
effective, she will not necessarily use them. Controlling for other possible causes, it 
appears that legislators who have more resources at their disposal will use media 
tactics more often, while those with less resources will use media tactics less 
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frequently. This has important implications for our understanding of media and 
politics. It appears that "the urge to play to the media is practically irresistible" 
(Rosenthal 1998: 109), only if a legislator is given the proper institutional support. 
As state legislators continue to become more professional, I expect that their use of 
media tactics will increase. While this could increase constituent knowledge of their 
legislator, it can also have deleterious effects. In particular, Alan Rosenthal suggests 
that the increasing use of the media by state legislators is one indication of a larger 
"decline of representative democracy." My findings suggest that Rosenthal's fears 
will become increasingly salient. 
Next, I find that while state legislators do indeed engage in media activities, 
traditional forms of legislating are still more prevalent. It appears that the use of 
media strategies augments rather than replaces a legislator's "bag of legislative 
tricks." Among media activities and strategies, issuing press releases is the most 
popular. Media activities that require more time and resources are generally avoided 
in deference to those that require expending fewer resources. The data also suggest 
that state legislators direct the majority of their media activities at their constituents. 
This does not tell the entire story, however. Over half of the respondents stated that 
they also seek to reach other legislators both in their own party as wen as the 
opposing party. Interest groups, as well as the public outside of their constituency, 
are also prime targets of media activities. The traditional belief that legislators are 
only concerned with reaching constituents with their media tactics appears to be false. 
State legislators have a variety of audiences in mind for their media tactics. Studies 
that focus solely on constituent media relations provide a rather shortsighted view of 
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media strategies. Future studies should recognize this and continue to examine how 
state legislators use media to communicate wi_th a variety of audiences. 
Most importantly for representation, it seems that legislators in professional 
state legislatures are more likely to use the media to communicate with constituents 
than are legislators in less professional legislatures. Since citizens gain the majority 
of their information about state politics from the media (Delli Carpini, Keeter and 
Kennemar 1994), legislators who are less apt to use media to communicate are likely 
to represent citizens who know less about their policy positions, their actions and 
their beliefs. In short, if legislators are less likely to use the media to communicate, 
citizens are less likely to be knowledgeable about their legislator. Although this study 
doesn't speak directly to this question, evidence seems to suggest that the process of ; 
representation, which depends on informed citizens, works better in states with 
professional legislatures where legislators have more active media strategies. Future 
studies should more specifically examine the relationship between citizen information 
about their representatives and professionalism. 
Implications for the Policy Process 
While this chapter speaks to representation, its conclusions speak most directly to the 
role of the media in the policy process. Most importantly, we now know that state 
legislators use the media in the policy process. While not as important as more 
traditional modes of legislating (contacting other legislators, speaking on the floor, 
etc.), the media is an actor in the policy process. This marks a significant 
improvement in our knowledge about legislative behavior. Recent evidence suggests 
that media is increasingly a tool used in congressional politics (Cook 1988; Cook 
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1998; Kedrowski 1996). It appears that it also a tool used to legislate in the states. 
We now better understand that using media is one of many tactics legislators use in 
the policy process. This is certainly not the last word on this subject. Indeed, much 
work needs to be done examining more specifically the nature and frequently of this 
relationship. Nonetheless, the findings here provide a necessary baseline to continue. 
This chapter has explored how state legislators use media relations to better 
complete their job. While primarily descriptive, it provides answers to some 
fundamental questions. Most importantly, this study provides empirical evidence that 
state legislators, like their congressional counterparts, often attempt use the media. 
Although their efforts might not always be successful, state legislators do attempt to 
affect the news. Scholars of state legislatures would be well advised to consider 
media relations as an important component of legislative behavior. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
MEDIA CONSUMPTION IN THE STA TE LEGISLATURE 
While the last chapter considered at length how legislators use media to disseminate 
information, this chapter changes gears sJightly and considers how legislators 
consume media. Surprisingly, while we continue to make inroads in understanding 
patterns of citizen media consumption, scholars have ignored, with very few 
exceptions (Weiss 1974), how e1ites consume media. This is particularly 
disconcerting considering the recent work of Susan Herbst (1998). In her 
examination of the Illinois State legislature, Herbst found that state legislative staff 
often consider media content and public opinion as the same thing. According to 
Herbst," ... all [of the staffers interviewed] believed that newspaper, television or 
radio content was not simply a conduit for public opinion expression: In their view, it 
is the very essence of public opinion and can support or destroy legislative initiatives" 
(Herbst 1998:65). While Herbst (1998) shows that media consumption is a vitally 
important part of the legislative process in IIlinois, she does not discuss patterns of 
consumption by legislators. This chapter picks up where Herbst left off, and 
examines patterns of media consumption in three disparate states. While no one has 
looked at this subject directly, there is nonetheless a wealth of literature on 
information use and communication in legislatures that informs this study. Although 
Chapter 2 discussed what this means for representation, more background is needed. 
In order to provide context for where the media fit into broader questions of 
information flow in legislatures, I first briefly review what we know about other 
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sources of information in legislatures as well as the status of media as compared to 
these other sources. Next, I discuss what little we know about patterns of elite media 
consumption in general. After this, I discuss the questions and hypotheses that guide 
this chapter. Finally, I discuss the findings. 
Information and Communication in Legislatures 
State legislative scholars have long studied how various sources of information cue 
the behavior and choices of legislators (Bradley 1980; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985; 
Wissel, O'Connor and King 1976). Unfortunately, while the literature frequently 
examines the role of other legislators (Mooney 1991a), the party caucus (Uslaner and 
Weber 1977), staff (Mooney 1991b), interest groups (Nownes 1999) and constituents 
(Bowman and Maggiotto 1981), few scholars, particularly at the state level have 
examined the role of the media as an information source. 
Together, these studies suggest that there are a number of different factors that 
can affect what a legislator knows about a particular issue. The role of organized 
interests, political parties, constituents, staff members and the opinions and 
predispositions of the legislator herself cannot be ignored. Neither, however, can the 
media. In his analysis of information sources in the state legislature, Christopher 
Mooney (1991b) found that legislators consult media as a source for information. 
Despite the fact that it is undoubtedly a major source of information, we know 
remarkably little about patterns of legislator media consumption. As two recent 
scholars surmised about the U.S. Congress, "Contemporary knowledge about 
Senators and Representatives' use of the mass media relies on an extremely limited 
number of studies that are both dated and limited in scope" (Bennett and Y anovitzky 
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2000). Certainly, the same can be said of similar studies in the state legislature. 
Although only one piece of the puzzle, gaining a better understanding how legislators 
consume various media sources wi11 give scholars a better picture of how legislators 
acquire information, and by extension, make decisions. 
What We Know About Media As An Information Source 
Almost three decades ago, John Kingdon (1973) suggested that while not as 
important as other sources, media can be important sources of information for voting 
decisions, particularly on salient issues. Furthermore, Kingdon posits that although 
not easy to measure, media have a strong indirect effect on the choices and priorities 
of legislators. This indirect effect may occur more often by affecting the legislator's 
agenda, rather than affecting decisions on issues that have already reached the 
agenda. Simply stated, legislators are-not immune from the agenda setting effects of 
the media (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). 
Despite early suggestions of an indirect effect of the media as an information- 1 
source, few scholars have tackled this important area of research. Carol Weiss (1974) 
examined media consumption by a number of leaders in American society, including 
U.S. Senators and Representatives. Weiss concludes that members of Congress 
frequently read major newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington 
Post. Slightly fewer reported reading the major newsmagazines. Bennett and 
Yanovitzky (2000) found that members of Congress exhibit evidence of a selection 
bias meaning that members' choices of media outlets are determined largely by 
partisan leanings. Specifically, Democratic members are more likely to read 
traditionally liberal newspapers (such as the Washington Post), while their 
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Republican counterparts are more likely to consult conservative stalwarts like the 
Washington Times. 
While these studies provide a glimpse of the work that has been done 
regarding media consumption in Congress, only one study has examined media 
consumption in the state legislature. Daniel Riffe (1990) surveyed Alabama state 
legislators regarding their media consumption and found that "legislators' views of 
the news media's role may affect ratings of news media as information sources" 
(1990:323). Legislators who believe the media function in an adversarial role are less 
likely to be heavy consumers of news for policy information. Likewise, legislators 
who perceive the media as an "agent of consensus" are more likely to believe that 
acquiring policy information from media is useful. 
Questions and Hypotheses 
Using survey data described in Chapter 1, I seek to answer a number of questions 
regarding media consumption in the state legislature. First, when legislators use 
media as a source for policy information, what outlets do they use? Answering this 
question will not only give scholars a better idea of how legislators gain information 
for decision-making purposes, but can also provide legislators with a better 
understanding of where to aim their media strategies. I hypothesize two relationships 
stemming from this question. Since legislators are primarily concerned with re-
election (Mayhew 1972) and must stay in touch with their district in order to remain 
in office, I hypothesize: 
H1: Legislators consume district media more often than capital media. 
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Also, considering that print media is generally credited with providing better 
coverage of state politics (Gormley 1978), I hypothesize: 
H2: Legislators consume print media more often than televised media. 
The second research question asks: What factors predict how often a legislator 
will utilize the media as a source of information? Little theoretical literature suggests 
which variables affect a legislator's propensity to consume media. To begin 
exploring this dynamic, I include variables representing district characteristics (state 
in which the legislator serves, district income), as well as institutional characteristics 
(chamber, legislator's party), and legislator characteristics (age, gender, and a final 
attitudinal variable measuring media entrepreneurship). While the other variables are 
relatively self-explanatory, a few words about the final variable are in order. The 
final variable is an attitudinal variable indicating where the legislator falls on the 
scale of media entrepreneurship (Kedrowski 1996). Whi1e related, I should note that 
this is a theoretically distinct concept from consumption. While entrepreneurship 
measures how a legislator feels about using media as a means of disseminating 
information, consumption measures how often a legislator reads newspapers and 
magazines, watches television, listens to the radio and reads articles on the Internet. 
It is quite conceivable that, for a variety of reasons, a legislator might use media 
strategies to disseminate information, but not have the time or inclination to consume 
media. Nonetheless, consistent with Kedrowski's (1996) findings about members of 
Congress, I hypothesize: 
H3: Legislators who score higher on a scale of media entrepreneurship will be 
more avid consumers of media than legislators who score lower on the scale. 
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Taken together, answers to these questions should provide a much better 
understanding of how state legislators use media as a source for policy information. 
The results are presented next. 
Results 
Each legislator was asked to indicate on a four-point scale their response to the 
following question: "When you are seeking information regarding public policy, how 
often do you consult each of the following sources?" The question was asked 
regarding a number of media sources including: paper of record in the state capital, 
alternative newspaper in the state capital, newspaper in the legislator's district, 
specialized trade publications and newsletters, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, 
Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, weekly magazines (e.g. Time, 
Newsweek), National Public Radio, CNN, local newscasts in state capital, local 
newscasts in the legislator's district, local public access television, and the Internet. 
The list was constructed to include district, capital and national media as well as print, 
television and "new media." Although certainly not exhaustive, I believe this list 
accurately represents the media outlets most likely to be consumed by state 
legislators. 
The data suggest that legislators are most likely to read the newspaper in their 
home district. The local newscast in their district is of secondary importance. Next, 
legislators are most likely to read the paper of record in the capital, followed by the 
newscast in the capital. Specialized publications and magazines, the alternative 
newspaper in the state capital, and the Internet are next. Finally, public access 
television, National Public Radio, weekly magazines (Time, Newsweek, etc.), Wall 
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Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor 
are consulted the least often. The results are presented in Table 9. 
In sum, it appears that legislators stay abreast of policy information first and 
foremost by consuming media that comes from their district, regardless of the form. 
Although legislators may consult capital and national media, they are secondary to 
district media. In order to test this assertion further, I conducted a difference of 
means tests comparing the frequency with which legislators consume the primary 
district media (district newspaper and district newscast) and the primary capital media 
(paper of record in state capital and capital newscasts). The difference is highly 
significant (t= 8.205; p<.001), suggesting that legislators are significantly more 
likely to consume district than capital media. This -is consistent with the hypothesized 
relationship. This also suggests that despite increasing professionalism, legislators 
still find ways to stay in touch with their constituents. If, as Herbst (1998) suggests, 
legislators use media content to understand public opinion, it appears that legislators .: · 
are most concerned with public opinion in the district. 
Next, a quick glance at Table 9 suggests that print media are consulted more 
frequently as sources of policy information than electronic media. To test this 
assertion, I conducted a difference of means test to compare print and electronic 
media. The first group consists of the frequency with which legislators consume the 
primary newspaper outlets (paper of record in state capital and paper of newspaper in 
home district). The second group measures the frequency with which legislators 
consume the primary televised media (newscasts in state capital and newscasts in 
home district). The difference between these two groups is highly significant 
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(t=3.952, p<.001). It seems that the newspaper is still the leader for state legislative 
news. This is consistent with- H2• Print media are generally credited with providing 
better and more complete coverage of state politics (Gormley 1978). Considering 
this, it is not surprising that legislators prefer print media to televised media. 
Furthermore, Herbst's respondents in the Illinois legislature refer almost exclusively 
to print based media when discussing the uses of media content for understanding 
public opinion. 
Who Consumes Media? 
The above data suggest that legislators use media to gather policy information and 
that print media and district media are preferred. Next, I seek to find out what factors 
predict whether a legislator will consult the media for policy information. I also seek 
to find if this varies by type of media. To test these questions, I ran five OLS 
regression models. The first tests the factors that predict total media consumption, 
the second looks at print media consumption, the third examines television 
consumption, the fourth examines consumption of National Public Radio and the fifth 
examines consumption of Internet news. These models should provide a glimpse of 
the patterns of media consumption on the whole, as well as demonstrate differences 
between each major type of media. For each model, independent variables were 
included for state (Georgia, Iowa-one dummy variable for each), average income in 
the district (income), party of the legislator (l=Democrat), chamber of the legislator 
(l=upper house), gender of the legislator (l=male), age of the legislator (age), and 
leadership status (l=party or legislative leader). The final independent variable, 
entrepreneurship, is a scale measuring a legislator's propensity to view the media as a 
90 
useful means of communicating with a variety of audiences-what Kedrowski (1996) 
refers to as media entrepreneurship. To construct this scale, each legislator was asked 
to indicate (on a five point scale) how strongly he or she agreed with four statements 
regarding media as a tool for legislating. The scores for each question were added 
together to produce a score of entrepreneurship. This score ranges from four to 
twenty. The surveys items used to create the scale are listed below. 
1. Members of the state legislature often solicit media exposure (i.e. interviews, 
talk show appearances, op-eds, press releases, etc.) as a way to stimulate 
discussion about policy proposals. 
2. Soliciting media exposure is a particularly effective way to put an issue on the 
legislative agenda. 
3. Media exposure is an effective way to convince other legislators in both 
chambers to support policy proposals. 
4. Media exposure is an effective way to stimulate discussion on policy 
alternatives and issues among executive branch officials. 
The questions used to create this scale are identical to those used by Kedrowski 
(1996) to measure a member of Congress' propensity to utilize the media as an output 
for information. Kedrowski found the scale to be valid (1996: 67). Results from all 
five models are displayed in Table 10. 
Total Media Consumption 
As stated previously, each legislator was asked how often she consumes 
fifteen different media sources. Each legislator's response to each of these questions 
was averaged together, creating a single scale of total media consumption where 
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scores ranged from one to four. This scale was used as dependent variable in the total 
media consumption model. While the dependent variable is not continuous, the 
distribution of the residuals is normal, and the model seems appropriate for OLS 
regression. The model produces a number of substantively important findings. First, 
entrepreneurship is significant (p<.05). This suggests that a legislator's propensity to 
utilize the media to communicate with a variety of audiences is significantly related 
to his/her propensity to use media to gather information. In other words, legislators 
seem to have an overall impression of the usefulness of the media, regardless of 
whether the media is being used as a way to gather information or a way to 
disseminate information. 
Democrat is also significant (p<.01) suggesting that Democratic state 
legislators are more likely than Republicans to use the media as a source for policy 
information. Although there are a number of possible explanations for this 
relationship, the most likely has direct implications for the role theory of media 
consumption (Riffe 1990). A number of scholars have found that statehouse 
journalists are overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic (Rozell 1994; Beyle, Ostdiek 
and Lynch 1996). It is likely then that Republican legislators' daily interactions with 
the largely Democratic statehouse press corps leads them to view the press as 
adversaries. Although Beyle, Ostdiek and Lynch (1996) find that the content of the 
state press coverage is not biased towards Democrats, Republican legislators may feel 
that the predominately liberal capital press corps they interact with on a daily basis 
are working against rather than with them. Accordingly, they consume less media. 
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Male is weakly and negatively related (p<.1), suggesting that female state 
legislators are more likely to use media as a source for policy information. One 
possible explanation for this relationship stems from work on casework and 
constituency service. Richardson and Freeman ( 1995) found that female state 
legislators put more time into casework than their male counterparts. Since we know 
that district media are preferred, it is entirely plausible that the information seeking 
behavior of female legislators is part of a larger concern for constituency service. 
Future studies should continue to probe this dynamic. 
Finally, Georgia and Iowa are negatively related (p<.05). This suggests that 
legislators in Georgia and Iowa are less likely to utilize media as a source for policy 
information than their counterparts in California. It is likely that due to larger staff 
resources afforded California state legislators, California legislators have more time 
to consume media than legislators in less professional states where the legislator 
herself must take greater responsibility for the daily goings on in the legislative 
office. 
While the previous model demonstrates broad trends in media consumption; 
we still do not know if patterns of media consumption in general hold for each type of 
media. In other words, do certain types of legislators consume one type of media at 
the expense of others? To answer this question, the next four models examine major 
outlets for state politics and government news. 
Print Media Consumption 
The first model tests the factors that predict a legislator's propensity to 
consume print media. The dependent variable is the average of 10 questions asking 
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how frequently a legislator consumes a number of different media (Wall Street 
Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Weekly 
magazines, e.g. Time, Newsweek). The scale ranges from one to four. The residuals 
are normally distributed and although not continuous, the dependent variable seems 
appropriate for OLS. 
There are some differences between this model and the total consumption 
model discussed previously. Three of the five significant variables in the total 
consumption model are not significant here. Democrat (p<.05) is once again 
significant and entrepreneurship (p<. l) is weakly related. Male, Georgia and Iowa, 
which were all negatively significant in the last model, are not significant in the print 
consumption model. These changes suggest that legislators distinguish between 
different types of media-- consuming one medium often at the expense of another. 
The data suggest that each medium attracts a different population of legislators. 
Television Consumption 
The next model tests the factors that predict a legislator's propensity to 
consume televised media. The dependent variable is the average of a respondent's 
answer to questions regarding the frequency with which he/she consumes the 
following media: CNN, local newscasts in the state capital, local newscasts in your 
district and local public access television. Responses range from one to four. Once 
again, the distribution of the residuals is normal and the model appears appropriate 
forOLS. 
Entrepreneurship (p<.01), District Income (p<.01, negatively); Democrat 
(p<.05) are all significant. Male (p<.1) is negatively and weakly related. Once again, 
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there are significant changes from the previous models, suggesting that there is 
variation in patterns of consumption. Entrepreneurship is highly significant. It 
appears that legislators who feel that the media is a more effective tool to disseminate 
information are most likely to consume televised media. District income is also 
significant (negatively) for the first time. While the income of the district has no 
impact on total media consumption and print media consumption, it is highly 
significant in a negative direction for televised media consumption. Legislators from 
poorer districts are more likely to consume televised media than legislators from 
wealthier districts. If legislators use media content as a proxy for public opinion 
(Herbst 1998), it appears that legislators from poorer districts receive a different 
picture of public opinion than legislators from wealthier districts. Since newspapers 
have more space devoted to news than ~elevised media, legislators from poorer 
districts may receive a more incomplete picture of public opinion than legislators who 
utilize print media more frequently. Their opinion of opinion may be skewed towards 
stories that are covered on television, but may be avoided in the newspaper. Finally, 
females are more likely to consume televised media than males. Since this variable 
was significant for the overall model, but not significant for print consumption, it 
appears that it is the consumption of televised media that is driving the significant in 
the total consumption model. Again, it appears that women find something more 
appealing than men in the news coverage on television. Reasons for this relationship 
are somewhat puzzling. Future studies should address this dynamic in more detail. 
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National Public Radio Consumption 
The next model uses consumption of National Public Radio (NPR) as the 
dependent variable. Responses ran from one to four. Examination of the residuals 
suggests that the model is appropriate for OLS. NPR is a slightly different medium 
than the others examined thus far. First, it is explicitly national in its focus. Second, 
it has long been known as a source of good, "hard" news- something in scarce supply 
on local television and many of the other outlets analyzed thus far. Also, NPR is the 
only radio outlet discussed in this paper. There is typically a picture of the NPR 
audience as more affluent and homogeneous than the audience of other mediums. 
Once again, Democrat is highly significant (p<.01), suggesting that 
Democratic state legislators are much more likely to utilize National Public Radio to 
gain policy information than their Republican counterparts. This is not surprising. 
NPR has long been perceived as a liberal institution (Kedrowski 1996) and fitting 
with role theory (Riffe 1990) would most likely be perceived as adversarial by 
Republican legislators. Male is also negatively related (p<.01). It appears that female 
legislators are more likely to consume both NPR and television than their male 
counterparts. Entrepreneurship is not, however, significant. It appears that attitude 
towards using the media in general as a tool for legislating and re-election does not 
make a legislator more likely to listen to National Public Radio to gather policy 
information. Legislators seem to make a key distinction between media and general 
and NPR in particular. For many of the reasons cited earlier, NPR is a different type 
of media and should be treated as such. Georgia is also significant in this model 
(p<.05) suggesting that Georgia state legislators are more likely to consume national 
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public radio than legislators in Iowa and California. Finally, income is weakly related 
(p<.1). Certainly, NPR is a media outlet consumed predominately by the wealthy. 
Thus is no surprise that legislators from wealthier districts would see NPR as a more 
worthwhile source of infonnation than their counterparts from other districts. 
Together, these results suggest that legislators view NPR as fundamentally different 
than other types of media. 
Internet Consumption 
The Internet is a growing source of news and information for citizens and 
legislators alike (Davis 1999; Davis and Owen 1998). Accordingly, the final model 
tests variables that predict the frequency with which legislators use the Internet for 
policy information. The dependent variable ranges from one to four. Once again, 
tests suggest that the model is appropriate for OLS. 
Here, Iowa (p<.01) and Georgia (p<.1) are negatively related to the dependent 
variable, suggesting that legislators from California are more likely to use the Internet 
as a source of policy information than legislators from other states. While there could 
be a number of reasons to explain this relationship, the most likely explanation is that 
the higher levels of professionalism in California afford California legislators better 
resources, more time as well as better technological support and training for accessing 
the Internet. Surprisingly, the data also suggest that younger legislators and male 
legislators are no more likely to use the Internet as a source for policy infonnation 
than other legislators. Despite the common perception that Internet users are 
primarily young and male (Davis 1999; Pitkow 1998), the data do not support this 
conclusion for state legislators. It appears that institutional support is more important 
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than demographic characteristics in predicting how often a legislator will use the 
Internet for policy information. Certainly, future studies should continue to examine 
this dynamic in more detail as the Internet becomes a more important part of the 
legislative process. 
Conclusions and Implications For Representation 
This chapter has produced a number of key findings. First, I find that legislators 
prefer district media to either capital or national media when seeking policy 
information. Certainly, this has important implications for legislative representation. 
While legislatures may be becoming increasingly professional (King 2000) and 
legislators may spend more time in the state capital, it appears that legislators have 
continued to be concerned about constituency opinion. Through consumption of 
district media, legislators continue to stay abreast of district public opinion (Herbst 
1998). While this may be viewed as positive, there is certainly a negative side. If a 
legislator's view of the happenings in their district is largely influenced by media in 
their home district, this places a substantial burden on media outlets and journalists. 
Journalists craft their story with a variety of purposes in mind, foremost among these 
attracting the attention of the average citizen and providing them with information 
they need. It is unlikely that journalists consider the sorts of specialized information 
legislators need to make informed decisions. Indeed, there seems to be a mismatch is 
the motivations of the information provider (the journalist) and the information 
consumer (the legislator). If legislators draw inferences about public opinion from 
district media content, scholars of public opinion and state politics should spend more 
time examining the nature and content of this coverage as well as the behavior of 
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journalists in the states. Future studies should also see if the legislator's choice of 
media varies as the political ambitions of the legislator shift. In other words, as 
legislators set their sights on higher office, do they become more concerned with 
media content in other parts of the state? The capital? Does their attitude towards 
national media change? Although I would suspect the answer to these questions are 
in the affirmative, the data presented here does not speak to the issue. Future studies 
should. 
I also find that print media are genera1ly preferred to televised media. The 
Internet, while an important source of information is stm not consumed as often as 
more traditional media. Legislators who seek media coverage to reach their 
colleagues would be well advised to expend their media efforts writing editorials and 
courting print journaJists. Efforts spent courting televised media appear to be much 
less successful in reaching other legislators. 
The data also suggest that Democratic state legislators are generally more 
likely to use the media to gather information than Republican legislators. This 
appears to support the role theory of media relations (Riffe 1990). Due to contact 
with overwhelmingly Democratic statehouse reporters, Republican lawmakers are 
likely to view the press as an adversary. Thus, they consume media less frequently 
than Democratic legislators who may view the media as an any. The age of the 
legislator, whether the legislator is a party or legislative leader and whether the 
legislator resides in the upper or lower house appears to have no effect on the type of 
media the legislator consumes. 
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I have also shown that National Public Radio and the Internet are 
fundamentally different than other media. Patterns of usage found for print and 
televised media are not found in these more specialized outlets. Most important, it 
appears that demographic characteristics have little impact on a legislator's 
propensity to use the Internet for gathering information. The only significant 
variables appear to be based on institutional, rather than district or legislator 
characteristics. In other words, it appears that if state legislators are given the means 
for Internet access, many of the well-documented variables in the digital divide (age, 
gender) cease to be important determinants as to whether legislators will utilize the 
media for information seeking behavior. Future studies should continue to examine 
these non-traditional media outlets, probing to see how they will affect the legislative 
process in the 21st century. 
While I do not suggest that the media are the only source of information in 
state legislatures, evidence shows that the media do play a role. Gaining a better 
understanding of this role gives us a more complete picture of the information 
gathering behavior and decision-making environment of state legislators. 
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CHAPfERV: 
ETABLISHING A PLACE FOR E-MAIL AND THE INTERNET: 
COMPUTERIZED MEDIA AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE 
Unfortunately, media studies seem to be divided into those that consider the Internet 
and e-mail exclusively (Adler, Gent and Overmeyer 1998; Davis 1999; Davis and 
Owen 1998; Messmer, Carreiro and Metivier-Carreiro 2000; Richardson, Daugherty 
and Freeman 2001) and those that ignore computerized media and focus instead on 
traditional media (Cook 1998; Kedrowski 1996). In order to combat this problem, I 
consider both traditional media and non-traditional media. While previous chapters 
have focused on traditional print and televised media, this chapter focuses specifically 
on computerized media. This should provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between state legislators and all types of media. 
The literature on the Internet and e-mail in legislatures is small. Few scholars 
have established how, when, or why state legislators use the Internet and/or e-mail. 
Slightly more literature examines how members of Congress use the Internet and e-
mail. As a result, although this chapter concentrates specifically on the use of 
Internet and e-mail in the state legislature, the following section will review what we 
know about e-mail and the I'l)ternet in Congress as well as e-mail and the Internet in 
the state legislature. 
E-Mail and the Internet in Congress 
Members of Congress began using the Internet to complete their jobs in 1993 
(Browning 1994, cited in Adler, Gent and Overmeyer 1998). Since then, virtually 
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every member has secured an e-mail account. Also, due to Newt Gingrich's Cyber 
Congress project, hundreds of legislators have created web pages (Adler, Gent and 
Overmeyer 1998). In studying why certain member use the web for constituent 
contact while other shirk such web page use, Adler, Gent and Overmeyer (1998) find 
that "Republicans, younger legislators, and representatives of more affluent 
populations are more likely to reach out to constituents through homepages" (592). 
Research has also suggested that Congressional web pages do not tend to include 
controversial information, but rather contain mostly neutral information (Messmer et. 
al 2000). Messmer et. al (2000) also find that members' Internet pages are not 
catered to district messages but instead are generally aimed at national audiences and 
contain broad messages. 
E-Mail and the Internet in State Legislatures 
While state legislators have been somewhat slower to adopt and use the Internet and 
e-mail than their congressional counterparts, they have nonetheless closed this gap in 
recent years (Davis 1999). In her study of the New York assembly, Antoinette Pole 
(2000) found that while there is some resistance from older legislators, many state 
legislators are now using the World Wide Web to gain information and to disseminate 
it. In sum, Pole's study suggests that at least in one legislature, e-mail and the 
Internet are beginning to change the way state legislators complete their jobs. 
In their study of the Tennessee legislature, Richardson, Daugherty and 
Freeman (2001) investigate how state legislators use e-mail to communicate with 
their constituents. They find that e-mail is an increasingly important part of 
constituency service and constituency contact. Moreover, they find that neither 
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district characteristics nor legislator characteristics are significant factors in 
predicting the number of constituency requests a legislator receives over e-mail. The 
only significant factors predicting this relationship are the legislator's attitude towards 
constituency service in general and the use of other contact methods such as office 
hours (Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 2001 ). In short, they find no "digital 
divide" in what types of citizens make e-mail requests. The Richardson, Daugherty 
and Freeman (2001) study is commendable as is it the only extant work that takes a 
quantitative look at how state legislators use e-mail. While their study is a step 
forward, more research is necessary for two reasons. First, while Richardson, 
Daugherty and Freeman (2001) give us a good picture of the patterns of e-mail use in 
the Tennessee legislator, we do not know if their findings are generalizeable to other 
legislatures. Here, I look at how e-mail has affected legislators in three disparate 
states. Second, the Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001) study is limited to the 
use of e-mail for constituency contact and ignores other possible uses for e-mail. 
A recent survey found that 72% of Americans think that the growth of Internet 
technology and e-mail will improve the process of representation in the United States 
(Greenberg 2001). Other observers claim that the advent of new technology will have 
little impact on the democratic process in the United States (Davis 1999). The bottom 
line is that we have little hard evidence either way. This chapter is an early attempt to 
shed light on the use of e-mail and the Internet in the state legislature. 
Plan of This Chapter 
In this chapter, I add to the nascent literature on information technologies in state 
legislatures, concentrating on a few central questions. First, how pervasive is the use 
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of e-mail and the Internet in state legislatures? While the Richardson, Daugherty and 
Freeman (2001) study provides a nice baseline of information; it examines only one 
state and only in a limited context (e-mail for constituency contact). Next, I ask, what 
factors predict whether a legislator will use e-mail and the Internet? Do legislators 
use e-mail and Internet as a low-cost means of reaching audiences when they have 
few resources? Who do legislators intend to reach with their use of e-mail and the 
Internet? It is assumed that they aim to reach constituents, but do legislators aim to 
reach other members of the public as well? Other legislators? Other elites? Finally, 
by comparing the results garnered here to those found in Congress, how do state 
legislators and members of Congress differ in their use of information technology? 
After discussing the data source, I will discuss the results into two sections, one 
addressing how legislators use electronic mail and the other addressing legislator use 
of web pages. At the end, I will make some broad conclusions about what the data 
suggest about these two technologies taken in conjunction. 
The Data 
To answer these questions, I utilize data gathered from two sources. The first is a 
survey of state legislators in Iowa, Georgia and California. The second is a brief 
analysis of legislator web sites. Details on the survey are provided in Chapter 1. The 
second data source, however, needs a little more explanation. 
To compliment the survey, I conducted a brief analysis of web sites of the 
universe of state legislators in all fifty states. First, I checked to see if the legislator 
had a web page associated with their job as legislator. If the legislator did have a 
page, I next looked to see if the page was created by the legislator, the legislature, or 
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the caucus. Generally, this was quite easy to determine. Most pages have a note at 
the bottom indicating who is responsible for creating and maintaining the page. 
When the responsible party was not identified at the bottom of the page, I e-mailed an 
official at the legislature to find out who was responsible. This method provides a 
crude, but useful way to get a fee) for the content of state legislative web pages, and 
identify who controls the content of legislative web pages. 
Results: Electronic Mail 
Each legislator was asked a number of questions regarding his/her use of e-mail. 
First, each legislator was asked, "Do you have an e-mail account?" Of 193 
legislators who returned surveys, 177 responded that they do have an e-mail account 
(91.7%). It appears that almost all state legislators today have an e-mail account 
associated with their job as legislator. The question then arises, who are legislators 
using e-mail to communicate with? 
Previous studies have established that legislators aim to reach constituents and 
use e-mail as a new means of constituency service (Richardson, Daugherty and 
Freeman 2001). Indeed, most articles speculating about the role of e-mail in state 
legislatures concentrate on constituency contact (Boulard 2000; Bouquard and 
Greenberg 1996; Greenberg 2001; Jones 1999). The question remains, is this the 
only use for e-mail, or do legislators utilize e-mail to reach other groups as well? To 
answer this question, each legislator who indicated that they have e-mail was asked, 
"Who do you use e-mail to communicate with? Check all that apply." Response 
categories were as follows: constituents, other legislators, government agencies, 
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governor's office, party leaders, personal use, other. Figure 4 presents the results 
from this question. 
The data suggest that legislators use e-mail to communicate with groups other 
than their constituents. While 154 (91.7% of those with e-mail) legislators indicate 
that they use e-mail to communicate with constituents, over three quarters of these 
legislators also indicate that they use e-mail to communicate with other legislators. 
Over half of the legislators who responded indicate that they use their e-mail to 
communicate with government agencies. Just under one half indicate they use e-mail 
to communicate with party leaders and over one third use e-mail to communicate with 
the Governor's office. Taken together, these data suggest that e-mail is becoming an 
important new means of communication, not only for constituent contact, but for 
reaching political elites as well. Particularly in the state legislature, where legislators 
spend considerable time outside the state capital, evidence suggests that e-mail can 
provide a vital link for legislators to build coalitions and communicate about policy 
and legislative issues. Scholars examining this dynamic in the future should move 
past the notion of e-mail as simply a new means of constituency contact. Evidence 
suggests that e-mail is used to reach a variety of audiences. Future studies should 
recognize this. 
While the vast majority of legislators may have e-mail access, that does not 
mean they utilize the technology. To probe deeper into this dynamic, I asked each 
legislator, "In an average week, how often do you check your e-mail?" While this is 
not a perfect measure of e-mail use, it does provide a rough measure of how much 
time legislators devote to communicating via e-mail. Certainly, a legislator who 
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checks her e-mail more than once a day places a higher priority on e-mail 
communication than a legislator who checks her e-mail once a week. Responses were 
coded as follows: 
5= More than once a day 
4= Once a day 
3= Every other day 
2= Once a week 
l=Less than once a week 
Responses to the previous question were used as a dependent variable in OLS 
regression. A number of independent variables were tested, including district 
characteristics, institutional characteristics and legislator characteristics. The 
variables employed are as follows: average district income (district income), urban or 
rural composition of the district (l=urban), state (Georgia, California), chamber 
(l=upper house), party {l= Democrat), age, leader (l=party or legislative leader) and~ 
gender (l=male). A final attitudinal variable was included (Internet attitude). This is 
a question asking legislators, "When you are seeking information regarding public 
policy, how often do you consult the Internet?" Answers were on a five-point scale 
ranging from never to frequently. Results from the model are displayed in Table 11. 
It appears that district characteristics have little effect on a legislator's 
propensity to frequently check e-mail. Neither urban nor district income are 
significant. Both of these findings are quite surprising. It is often suggested that the 
rich are more likely to use e-mail than the poor (Hindman 2000; Pitkow 1998). 
Likewise, Hindman (2000) found evidence of a rural-urban digital divide. I had thus 
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expected that legislators from wealthier districts would receive more e-mail and thus 
would check their e-mail more often than their counterparts representing poorer 
districts. The data did not bear out this hypothesis. While counter to broader trends 
in society, these findings support Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman's findings 
(2001). They found that district income and the urban composition of the district had 
no impact on the number of casework requests received over e-mail by Tennessee 
legislators. 
The data suggest that the state in which a legislator serves is significant. 
Georgia legislators are less likely to check their e-mail frequently than legislators 
from Iowa and California (p<.05). Surprisingly, California is not significant. I had 
expected that legislators from California would use e-mail more often than legislators 
from other states due to California's reputation as the center of the technological 
revolution. Most surprising, however, is not that the relationship is not significant, 
but that the direction of the relationship is negative. Although not significant, this 
suggests that California legislators not only do not check their e-mail more than 
legislators from other states, but may in fact check their e-mail less often. While this 
is initially counterintuitive, California is a more professional legislature. One 
possible explanation is that staff members rather than the legislator herself use e-mail 
in the legislative office. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that oftentimes staff 
members do answer e-mail for the legislator (Boulard 2000). California legislators 
also might receive so many e-mail requests, that they do not check e-mail themselves, 
or may limit the number of times they check e-mail. 
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Neither age, Democrat nor leader is significant in the model. Despite 
findings in other populations that those who use e-mail frequently are younger than 
their counterparts who do not use electronic mail (Hindman 2000), the data suggest 
that legislators do not follow this trend. The findings regarding party support those of 
Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001) who found that neither age, nor party 
were significant predictors of whether Tennessee legislators use e-mail for 
constituency service. Again, although Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001) 
examine only constituency service, their study provides the only baseline from which 
to make comparisons. 
Male is significant in this model (p<.01), suggesting that male state legislators 
check their e-mail more often than female legislators. This is consistent with broader. 
trends in Internet usage. Most studies have found that males are more likely to have 
web pages, to check e-mail and to spend time on-line than females (Davis and Owen 
1998; Hindman 2000; Pitkow 1998). While consistent with broader trends in society,; 
this finding is contrary to the conclusion of Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 
(2001) who found that Tennessee female state legislators receive more e-mail 
requests for casework than male state legislators. My findings suggest that although 
Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman (2001) may be correct that female state 
legislators receive more constituent requests via e-mail than males, females do not 
appear to use e-mail as often for other purposes. Indeed, it seems that if females 
receive more constituency requests via e-mail, it is because of their general outlook 
towards constituency service (Richardson and Freeman 1995), not because of their 
propensity to use e-mail. 
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Internet attitude is significant (p<.01). It appears that legislators who 
frequently use the Internet to gain policy information, are more likely to check their 
e-mail frequently. This suggests that legislators have an attitude towards the use of 
information technologies in general that may not vary depending upon the type of 
technology. Legislators who spend time on the Internet gathering policy information 
are more likely to utilize other information technologies. 
In sum, the data show that legislators from Georgia are less likely to use e-
mail frequently. Conversely, male legislators and legislators who see the Internet as a 
positive source for obtaining policy information are more likely to utilize e-mail 
frequently. While by no means the final word on the subject, these findings provide 
an early assessment of how e-mail is used in the state legislature. 
Results: Web Pages 
Many legislators view web pages as a low-cost, high-yield way to reach a number of 
audiences. Adler, Gent and Overmeyer (1998) found that increasingly, members of 
Congress are using web pages in the completion of their jobs. This section attempts 
to see if this conclusion applies to state legislators as well. 
A quick look at each state legislature's web page shows that almost all state 
legislators have web pages associated with their jobs as legislator. Furthermore, 
every legislator in Iowa and Georgia and all but 4 legislators in California have a web 
page associated with their job. At a minimum, each page lists contact information, 
the committees on which the legislator serves and basic biographical information. At 
a maximum, each legislator's page contained the above information, information on 
their district, the legislator's past votes, family information as well as information 
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about the legislature in general. While this would seem to suggest that the use of 
home pages for communication has penetrated the state legislature, when asked, "Do 
you have a web page associated with your job as legislator?" slightly less than half 
(91/185) of the state legislators in my survey responded in the affirmative. What 
explains this inconsistency? 
It appears that the inconsistency lies with how web pages are defined. Upon 
further examination, I found that while all but four legislators in the surveyed states 
have web pages, these pages are not controlled by the individual legislator, or by 
members of their staff, but rather by the either the legislature itself (in the case of 
Georgia and Iowa) or by the party caucus (in the case of California). It seems that 
while they are often referred to on the legislature's page as legislator "home pages," 
many legislators do not perceive them as such. Further examination of other states' 
web pages demonstrates that these states are not anomalies. Examination of web 
pages in all 50 state legislatures shows that the vast majority of legislator's individual 
pages are created not by the legislator, or legislative staff, but rather by a third party. 
Legislators in 44 states have their web pages created and maintained by the 
legislature itself, and four are maintained by each party caucus (California, 
Connecticut, Michigan and Indiana). In Indiana, the caucus controls web pages for 
the lower house, while the legislature controls web pages in the upper house. Finally, 
the Idaho state legislature has no individual web pages for members except those 
created by the legislator herself. Only one member of Idaho's upper house and four 
members of the lower house have created their own pages. In sum, the vast majority 
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of web pages associated with state legislators are actually created by either the 
legislature or the party caucus. 
So, how much control do legislators themselves have over the content and 
appearance of their page? The short answer is: not much. Although there is 
obviously tremendous variation from state to state, it appears that generally the third 
party vendor, whether it be the caucus or legislative support staff determines the 
appearance and features of the page. Officials from the legislatures indicated that 
generally, the content is taken from election pamphlets and includes little more than 
basic demographic and contact information. Although some states do include recent 
votes, officials from the stage legislatures indicated that this information is taken 
directly from the voting record. Legislators are generally not given any chance to 
explain votes or contribute to this information at all. As one legislator commented, 
"Legislative computer (non) support Bureau geeks do not allow us to 'tamper' with 
their insipid handiwork." When contacted via e-mail, legislative staff concurred. 
"The legislators have no control over the web site. The House and Senate Clerk's 
offices control all content," said the webmaster for one western state. Nor are 
legislators convinced of their utility. One legislator noted, "Our individual legislative 
web pages are strictly informational, non-interactive, and boring. Of almost no 
value." 
Of course, individual legislators are free to create their own web pages 
through an independent company (AOL, Mindspring, etc.). My research indicates 
that although this does happen, it is certainly not pervasive. Less than 5% of all 
legislators have a personal web page in addition to the page created for them by the 
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legislature or caucus. When a legislator does opt to create his/her own home page in 
addition to the page created for them by the legislature or caucus, it tends to include 
far more information than the pages created by the legislature or the caucus. 
Limitations, Conclusions and Implications 
Using a survey of state legislators in California, Georgia and Iowa, and a brief content 
analysis of web pages in all fifty states, I have explored how state legislators use e-
mail and the Internet. The data produce a number of findings. First, the data suggest 
that virtually all legislators have access to e-mail. While legislators may have varying 
attitudes towards the use of e-mail, evidence suggests that virtually all have the ability 
to access e-mail if they wish. Second, while legislators use e-mail most often to 
communicate with constituents, e-mail is also used to communicate with other actors • 
including other legislators, government organizations, etc. These alternate uses fore-
mail have been ignored in the literature. While the use of e-mail for constituency 
contact is certainly important, more research needs to be conducted regarding how e-::. 
mail is changing the way legislators communicate with other policy actors. Next, 
broad trend of a younger, urban cohort using e-mail is not found amongst legislators. 
While male legislators are more likely to check their e-mail frequently, other 
components of the "digital divide" are not found amongst legislators. 
Finally, this study concludes that web pages have a much different presence in 
the state legislature than they do in Congress. While web pages have become a new 
means of establishing a home style for members of Congress (Adler, Gent and 
Overmeyer 1998), state legislators have not made use of this valuable and cost-
efficient resource. Indeed, most legislators have little control over the content and no 
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control over the style of their web pages. The vast majority of legislators' web pages 
are not created by the legislators, but rather by support staff working for the 
legislature. Unfortunately, the result is that a potentially valuable resource of 
reaching a variety of interested publics is reduced to little more than a computer 
screen of contact information and demographics. 
These findings have direct implications for our broader understanding of the 
changing nature of representation in the state legislature. Alan Rosenthal ( 1998) has 
suggested that as legislators have increased their use of media tactics, polling and 
constituency contact, we have a seen a "decline in representative democracy." This 
has resulted in less deliberation, less consensus building, enfeebled leadership, and a 
host of other unintended consequences. Although Rosenthal does not expressly 
discuss e-mail and the Internet in his account of legislative life in the states, it could 
be a welcome addition to his work. Although e-mail is used for more than just 
constituency contact, it is primarily a means of reaching constituents. This is one 
more sign that legislators are engaging in less deliberation and more activity to 
appease their constituents. As Rosenthal suggests, this runs contrary to the intention 
of the founders. 
Government is no longer conducted with the consent of the governed, according to the 
original federalist plan. It is conducted with significant participation by the governed, and by 
those who claim to speak for the public's interest, according to a more populist plan. The 
voices of the elected representatives are being drowned out by pronouncements made on 
behalf the public. The legislature and the legislative process are in the throws of greater 
democratization. Representative democracy, as the states had experienced it for several 
centuries is in decline" (Rosenthal 1998: 4-5). 
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This is the first study to use a mu1ti-state survey to examine the use of e-mai1 
in the state legis]ature. Furthermore, it is the only study to examine the use of both e-
mail and web pages in the state Jegislature. Certainly more work needs to be done in 
this area. Scholars of state legis]atures need to recognize information technology as a 
new means of Jegislator communication. This communication, however, has 
implications beyond constituency contact. The advent of information technology is 
rather the beginning of a potentia11y different way of legislating and campaigning. 
This is a potentially fruitful and growing area of research. State legislative scho]ars 
wou]d be well advised to become aware of this growing trend. 
Scholars shou]d begin to consider computerized media and traditional media 
together. While the characteristics of the users may vary, they are both influential 
media. Furthermore, state legislators use both media to disseminate information as 
well as to gather information. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
At the outset of this dissertation, I suggested that we know little about the relationship 
between state legislators and media. For instance, no one has even established that 
state legislators use media at all. As a result, I sought to answer a number of basic, 
descriptive questions regarding the press/government connection in the state 
legislature. Although there is no specific theory testing, establishing a baseline of 
information will give scholars information from which to proceed. Hopefully, 
scholars will begin to recognize the states as prime laboratories for developing a 
theory of media and politics. Below, I review and discuss the major findings of this 
research. Next, I discuss the implications that the findings have for our understanding 
of legislative behavior and representation. Third, I discuss the limitations of the 
study. Finally, I conclude with a number of directions for future research. 
Major Findings 
The following section serves two purposes. First, it reviews the major findings 
gleaned from chapters 3, 4 and 5. More importantly, however, it places these findings 
in the context of the dissertation as a whole. 
State Legislators Use Media Tactics 
Prior to this study, no one had demonstrated empirically that media play any 
role in state legislative politics. Despite numerous assumptions, there was no hard 
evidence that a press/government connection existed in the states. My findings 
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suggest that media are important political actors in state legislative politics. State 
legislators often use media tactics to achieve a variety of goals. Furthermore. the 
media are not only used in the context of elections. Affecting media coverage is a 
goal of legislators before. during and after elections. Future studies examining the 
behavior of state legislators should recognize this. Likewise, now that we know state 
legislators use media tactics, future studies in political communication should 
concentrate on the state legislature as an area ripe for testing broader theories of 
media and politics. 
Traditional Means of Legislating Still Reign Supreme 
While I find that state legislators use media for a variety of purposes, media 
tactics remain secondary to more traditional means of legislating. Evidence suggests 
that the use of media strategies augments rather than replaces a legislator's "bag of 
legislative tricks." Certainly. this is the case in most political bodies. Recent studies 
that have examined the press activities of Congress and the Presidency almost 
uniformly agree that media tactics, while important, are still less important than 
personal contact with political elites, traditional campaigning and a variety of other 
traditional means of achieving policy goals (Kedrowski 1996). Among media tactics, 
press releases appear to be the most popular. All of this suggests that while scholars 
should begin to look at the media when they examine state legislative politics. the 
importance of the media can easily be overstated. Using the media is one of many 
ways to reach legislative goals-and not necessarily the most important. As one 
respondent commented, "No matter how many times a legislator argues his case in 
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the papers or on the airwaves, he'll end up losing the floor vote if he hasn't made 
direct contacts with his colleagues and his constituents." 
Legislators Want to Reach Many Audiences-Not Just Constituents 
There has been tremendous disagreement among congressional and media 
scholars about who members of Congress wish to reach with media tactics. In recent 
years, evidence has seemed to suggest that legislators seek to reach a variety of 
audiences-not just constituents (Kedrowski 1996). My findings support this view. I 
find that although state legislators seek to reach constituents first and foremost, they 
also seek to reach other legislators, interest groups and the public outside of their 
constituency. Future studies should recognize that the media are more than a new 
means of reaching constituents. Media tactics are a potentially fruitful and growing 
means of reaching a variety of audiences to realize a variety of goals. 
Resources Matter 
Among the most important conclusions of this dissertation, I find that 
resources matter in determining why some legislators actively seek media coverage, 
while others shirk media attention. SpecificaJly, I find that controlling for other 
factors, legislators from more professional state legislatures are more likely to use 
media than legislators from other states. State professionalism is not, however, a 
factor in predicting how effective legislators perceive media tactics to be. In other 
words, most legislators feel similarly about the effectiveness of media tactics, but 
vary in their tendency to use media tactics. This suggests that resources, rather than 
perceived effectiveness, are the most important factors determining the extent to 
which legislators wi11 use media tactics. This runs contrary to Timothy Cook's 
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(1998) suggestion that the intensity of a legislator's attempts to gain media coverage 
increase as the gap between resource~ and expectations increases. Certainly, this 
conclusion has implications for our broader understanding of both media and politics 
the effects of professionalism. These are discussed at length later in this chapter. 
The Garbage Can Continues to Explain Policy Formation in the States 
Congressional scholars have found that members of Congress tend to use 
media most often in the agenda setting state of the policy process (Kedrowski 1996). 
My findings suggest that this is not true in the state legislature. State legislators are 
no more likely to use media to set the agenda than they are in other stages of the 
policy process. Instead, the data support a garbage can model of the policy process. 
In short, this suggests that the policy process is not a linear process. It is an 
ambiguous process without distinguishable steps or "stages." In a garbage can model, 
legislators do not use the media to varying degrees in different stages because they do 
not see a distinction between the stages. The use of media tactics in the policy 
process is a much less predictable, planned process and is instead uneven and 
opportunistic. 
District Media are More Important Than Other Media 
I address not only issues of how state legislators use media to communicate 
with others, but also, how they consume media. Here, I find that legislators consume 
district media more often than capital media. Since legislators often use media as a 
means of knowing public opinion (Herbst 1998), it is not surprising that they are most 
concerned with knowing the opinion of their constituents. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates that although legislators may spend more time in the state capital than 
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they used to, they sti11 stay attuned to the opinion of their constituents. Although this 
may be viewed positively, there is certainly a downside. This places a substantial 
burden on media outlets and journalists. Since journalists must remain responsive to 
market forces rather than Democratic ideals, this can lead to a mismatch of goals, 
which may have serious political consequences. These are discussed later. 
Print Media are More Important Than Other Media 
Just as state legislators prefer capital media to district media, they prefer print 
to televised media. The Internet, while an important source of information is still not 
consumed as often as more traditional media. Legislators who seek media coverage 
to reach their colleagues would be well advised to expend their media efforts writing 
editorials and courting print journalists. Efforts spent courting televised media appear 
to be much less successful in reaching other legislators. 
Democrats Consume More Media 
I also find that Democratic state legislators are generally more likely to use 
the media to gather information than Republican legislators. This supports the role 
theory of media relations (Riffe 1990). Probably due to contact with overwhelmingly 
Democratic statehouse reporters, Republican lawmakers are likely to view the press 
as an adversary. Thus, they consume media less frequently than Democratic 
legislators who may view the media as an any. The age of the legislator, whether the 
legislator is a party of legislative leader and whether the legislator resides in the upper 
or lower house of the legislature appears to have no effect on the type of media the 
legislator consumes. 
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E-Mail is Pervasive in the State Legislature 
Unfortunately, most studies of media and politics study either exclusively 
traditional media (i.e. Cook 1989; Cook 1998; Kedrowski 1996; Page 1996) or "new 
media" (i.e. Davis 1999; Davis and Owen 1998). In this dissertation, I try to break 
this mold and examine how state legislators use both traditional and new media in 
their jobs. Among my key findings regarding new media, I find that e-mail is 
pervasive in state legislatures. Virtually all state legislators have access to e-mail. It 
appears that the resources are present for e-mail to become an important new means 
of communication in state legislatures. 
E-Mail ls Used For More Than Just Constituency Contact 
Earlier research has established that e-mail is becoming an important new 
means of constituency contact (Richardson, Daugherty and Freeman 20()1) but has 
ignored other possible uses of e-mail. My evidence suggests that this is shortsighted. 
While legislators use e-mail most often to communicate with constituents, e-mail is 
also used to communicate with other actors including other legislators, government 
organizations, etc. Although the use of e-mail for constituency contact is certainly 
important, more research needs to be conducted about how e-mail is changing the 
way legislators communicate with other policy actors. 
There ls Little Evidence of a Digital Divide in the State Legislature 
Previous research has suggested that frequent users of the Internet and e-mail 
are more likely to be wealthy, urban, young and male. It seems that the broad trends 
of a younger, urban cohort using e-mail are not found amongst legislators. While 
male legislators are more likely to check their email frequently, other trends found in 
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society are not found amongst legislators. This supports the work of Richardson, 
Daugherty and Freeman (2001) who find little evidence of a systematic upper class 
bias in determining which state legislators receive more constituency requests over e-
mail. 
Web Pages Are An Underutilized Means of Communication in the State Legislature 
I conclude that web pages have a much different presence in the state 
legislature than they do in Congress. Indeed, most state legislators have little control 
over the content and no control over the style of their web pages. The vast majority 
of legislators web pages are not created by the legislator, but rather by support staff. 
This finding is quite significant. It suggests that a potentially valuable resource (a 
legislator's web page) is reduced to little more than a computer screen of contact 
information and demographics. As Adler, Gent and Overmeyer ( 1998) observe, web 
pages can be a relatively cost-effective means of demonstrating a "home style" over 
the web. State legislators have been slow to recognize this. Adroit legislators in the 
future will recognize the potentially valuable contribution of this new technology. 
Implications 
I stated early in this dissertation that these findings will have implications for our 
understanding of how state legislators achieve their legislative goals as well as how 
the process of representation works in the states. Below, I review how our knowledge 
is applicable to these two areas 
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What Does This Mean For Our Understanding of How State Legislators Achieve 
Legislative Goals? 
When Richard Fenno posited that legislators seek to achieve re-election, good 
public policy and power inside the legislature, he concentrated on how legislators' 
activities at home help them realize their goals (1978). In this dissertation, I take a 
slightly different tack. Recognizing that the increasing professionalism of state 
legislatures is resulting in legislators spending more time in the state capital, I posit 
that state legislators often use media to achieve these goals. Specifically, I find that 
legislators use media tactics as one way of reaching their triad of legislative goals. 
While Fenno's work was certainly groundbreaking in its consideration of how 
legislators' activities at home help achieve goals, too little work has been conducted 
regarding how members use media to reach these goals-particularly in the state 
legislature. In sum, my findings suggest that media tactics should be considered 
alongside other means of achieving legislative goals. Using the media can be a way 
for legislators to demonstrate a home style without actual1y going home. Any scholar 
seeking to gain a ful] understanding of how legislators attain legislative goals should 
look at both media tactics and traditional means of realizing legislative goals. 
Scholars who discuss the impact of media on Congress and other political 
institutions general1y conclude that as media tactics become more important, political 
parties (Wattenberg 1998) and traditional notions of seniority (Ranney 1983) become 
Jess important. My data suggest that this is likely to occur in the state legislature, as 
wen. Indeed, John Bibby (1999) has suggested that political parties in the states have 
declined in power in recent years. What does this mean for how legislators achieve 
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their goals? First, by using media tactics, junior legislators will be able to bypass 
legislative norms and gamer influence in the legislature earlier than they would using 
traditional means of legislating. Second, if parties continue to decrease in 
importance, legislators will have a more difficult time forming coalitions and solving 
collective action problems-some of the major functions of parties. In sum, if the use 
of legislative tactics increases, political parties must change their role in order to 
maintain power and influence in the states (Bibby 1999). 
Although I have established that media are used in achieving legislative goals, 
I have not discussed how this affects the outcomes of these goals. When legislators 
use media tactics, they filter their message through an intermediary (the journalist). 
As Cook (1988, 1998) and Zaller (2002) discuss, the politician's message is not 
delivered unencumbered to the intended audience. Instead, the legislator's message is 
altered by the journalist. While at times the final product will look similar to what the 
legislator intends, it can often look far different. As Zaller (2002) notes, journalists, 
politicians and the citizens all have different goals in the negotiation of 
newsworthiness. What this means is that when communicating via media, politicians 
trust the interpretation of a non-elected mediator, who is subject to the motives of the 
journalism profession, rather than the motives of representative democracy. Chapter 
4 demonstrated that slight changes in media content can significantly alter the 
priorities, attitudes, opinions and choices of individuals. This process of filtering 
communications can have deleterious effects on the legislator's ability to realize their 
legislative goals. By choosing to communicate via media, legislators are gaining the 
ability to reach a variety of audiences at one time. The tradeoff for this economical 
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form of communication is that they lose some control over the message. Although it 
is outside the scope of this dissertation to examine exactly what these consequences 
are, certainly this is an area of inquiry worth exploring in future research. 
What Does This Mean For Our Understanding of Representation in the States? 
From Chapter 2, we learned that the media plays a vital role in two stages of 
representation-communicating with constituents and policy responsiveness. So, 
how do the findings presented here contribute further to our understanding of 
representation? 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Alan Rosenthal fears an increase in media 
tactics, polling and increased constituency contact has resulted in a "decline of 
representative democracy." Thus, in Rosenthal's view, if state legislators frequently 
use media tactics, this may hurt the system of representative democracy created by 
the founders. My data inform Rosenthal's findings in two different ways. First, my 
data suggest that state legislators do use media tactics. Certainly, this would trouble 
Rosenthal. Further, I find that the frequency with which legislators use media tactics 
varies tremendously by state--professional state legislatures using media tactics more 
often. Thus, my findings suggest that Rosenthal's fears of a decline in representative 
democracy are more salient in states with professional legislatures than in states that 
employ citizen legislatures. Unfortunately, Rosenthal makes little distinction based 
on the state context in his work. Surely, this is an important corrective to Rosenthal's 
concerns. Looking to the future, recent findings suggest that more and more state 
legislatures are professionalizing. As a result, I would expect that w~ will see a rise 
in the use of media tactics, and by extension, a further decline in representative 
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democracy. While it is outside of the scope of this study to determine if a decline in 
representative democracy is truly negative (as Rosenthal believes), my findings do 
suggest that Rosenthal is correct that we can expect to see a decline in representative 
democracy. 
While the above discussion is doubtless important, Rosenthal did not pen the 
only work on legislative representation in the states. As such, next I will discuss 
other possible implications for our understanding of representation. Most scholars 
agree that representation depends on some form of communication between 
legislators and their constituents. Moreover, this communication must be accurate. 
In other words, the ideas, policy stances and priorities of the legislator must be 
transmitted accurately to the constituent and vice-versa. Unfortunately, using 
traditional media necessitates a "negotiation of newsworthiness" whereby the 
legislator "negotiates" with the journalist over what will be covered and how it will 
be portrayed (Cook 1989). The outcome of the negotiation is the news. Certainly, 
this presents some problems for representation in the United States. If legislators use 
media to communicate with constituents, their message will be filtered and altered. 
The constituent's view of the legislator's activity will thus be altered in ways that 
may not be consistent with the ideal of representation. In short, when legislators use 
media as a means of communicating with constituents, representation is hurt. 
Unfortunately, studies of representation have ignored this serious and inevitable 
consequence of media politics in the United States. Likewise, as Chapter 6 discusses, 
legislators depend on media content to know the opinion of their constituents (Herbst 
1998). This too raises serious questions about representation. The media have well-
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established bias built into the newsgathering process4 (Gans 1978). If legislators use 
media to better understand public opinion, their view of their constituents' opinion 
will be skewed in the direction of the media coverage, as legislators are not immune 
from the consequences of agenda setting and framing discussed in Chapter 2. Again, 
due to this process, representation will not occur as our founders envisioned it. 
One way around some of these problems is to use computerized media. 
Creating a web page is one way to reach constituents as well as a variety of other 
groups with an unfiltered message. With web pages, there is no journalist to work 
through. The message goes directly from the legislator to the public. While this may 
create a new set of problems; used properly and responsibly, web pages and 
computerized media provide a possible avenue to improve representation in the 
United States. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 7, legislators do not generally 
have control over the content or style of their web pages. Smart legislators will begin 
to use web pages as a way to reach a variety of audiences. This will not only increase 
the effectiveness of their communication campaigns, but also may work towards 
better representation in the state legislature 
A Connection to Turnout? 
If the reader takes nothing else from this dissertation, she should realize that 
media are often used by state legislators in the completion of their jobs. At the core is 
a question left unaddressed-is this increasing reliance on the media positive for 
democracy? In a series of articles, Alan Gerber and Donald Green (2000a; 2000b) 
suggest that the decline in face-to-face contact between politicians and citizens is 
4 Not bias in the liberal-conservative sense, but rather bias towards the status quo, bias towards 
"official sources" and bias in the sense that every story must have "two sides." 
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partially responsible for decreased voter turnout in the United States. Another recent 
work suggests that decreased face-to-face contact between legislator and citizen 
constitutes a primary means of political participation. When citizens are denied this 
face-to-face contact, they are missing out on a key component of participation 
(Szarawarski 1999). Together, these studies suggest that if politicians (including state 
legislators) rely on media at the expense of face-to-face contact, turnout in the United 
States will continue to drop. Likewise, a number of studies have suggested that face-
to-face contact and personal ties are important in legislative decision-making. 
(Arnold, Dean and Patterson 2001; Calderia and Patterson 1987). All of this suggests 
that there are significant effects of an increasingly depersonalized and media-reliant 
legislature. Fortunately, for citizens of the United States, however, my findings do 
not support these doom and gloom fears. While it is true that I do find that state 
legislators use media, I do not find that they use media at the expense of traditional 
means of completing their jobs. As I stated earlier, my data suggest that media tactics 
augment, but do not replace traditional means of legislating. If legislators increase 
their use of media tactics, this does not necessarily mean that we will see a decline in 
face-to-face contact. 
A Connection to Social Capital? 
As I discussed above, media play a key role in state legislative politics. 
Legislators use media both as a means of both disseminating information and gaining 
information about public opinion. The previous section discussed how this may have 
deleterious consequences for democracy in the form of decreased voter turnout. 
Another related concern regards social capital. Social capital is defined as " ... [the] 
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features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1995: 67). The decline in 
voter turnout, according to Robert Putnam is merely a symptom of a larger problem-
the decline in social capital. Although the cause is far from certain (Uslaner 1998), 
Putnam believes that most evidence points to the rise in television as the most direct 
cause of the decline in social capital in America. Certainly, if state legislators are 
using various forms of media as a means of communication, this could further 
exacerbate the problems associated with declining social capital in America. A 
decline in social capital could lead to a further decline in civic participation generally, 
a decline in group membership, a decline in church attendance and a general decline 
in the feeling of connectedness between citizens. Certainly, none of these are trivial 
consequences. This discussion highlights the possibly deleterious effects that a 
media-reliant legislature can have on a democratic polity. 
Limitations 
Although this dissertation has made a number of contributions to literature on state 
legislatures and political communication, there are, as with any study, a number of 
limitations. They are reviewed below. 
Problems Inherent in Sampling 
This study only considers evidence from three states. Although every effort 
was made to ensure that these states were representative of the population of state 
legislators across the country, it is entirely possible that legislators in California, 
Georgia and Iowa are different than legislators in other states. Furthermore, although 
respondents in these states do not differ from non-respondents demographically, they 
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could differ in other ways. Although there is no way of testing for this. it is possible 
that those who responded have a different attitude towards media tactics than 
legislators who chose not to return the survey. Unfortunately. there is no way to 
ensure that those who responded are similar to those who did not respond. In sum, 
while I frequently suggest that my findings have implications for the universe of state 
legislators. this claim must be treated with some care. 
Problems Inherent in Survey Research 
Survey research, although valuable, is haunted by problems. First, by 
definition, survey research deals with perceptions rather than reality. Each question 
in this survey asked legislators about their feelings towards using media, or asked 
them to self-report how often they engage in certain activities. Certainly, there is 
tremendous room for error here. It is possible that for a variety of reasons, legislators 
did not answer questions truthfully. Extensive research has cited problems with 
survey questions that have a socially desirable answer. Although no questions appear 
to have problems with social desirability, there is simply no way of ensuring that 
people are truthful with their answers. 
Next, many questions asked legislators to place their answer on a scale (i.e. 
strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). Although these scales are 
used frequently, there is no way to ensure that one legislator's answers will be 
consistent with another's. In other words, there is no way to know if one legislator's 
opinion of "disagree .. is the same as another. Although these scales do provide a 
rough indication of the intensity of a legislator's opinion, they are not perfect. The 
results garnered from these questions should thus be treated with some care. 
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Talk Radio? 
Although I made every attempt to ask legislators about as many different 
forms of media as possible, some were given short shrift. In particul~, this study 
does not adequately address talk radio. Talk radio marks an important and growing 
means of political communication (Barker 1999; Cappella, Turow and Jamieson 
1996; Hofstetter 1998). Talk radio can directly impact people's attitudes about 
politics in a number of ways. First, talk radio can directly impact attitudes towards 
specific political figures (Barker and Knight 2000). Scholars have found that talk 
radio increases people's levels of information about politics (Hofstetter et. al 1999). 
Alternatively, it can also increase misinformation (Hofstetter et. al 1999). Talk radio 
can also create a new kind of social network (Barker 1998)--which in tum increases 
the political participation of the listeners. Since appearing on talk radio costs the 
legislator nothing other than time, and evidence demonstrates that listening to talk 
radio can influence not only people's attitudes and opinions, but can also mobilize 
people to act, it stands to reason that state legislators would see appearing on talk 
radio as an effective means of reaching a politically interested public. Future studies 
should address the role of talk radio in the state legislature. 
While these limitations are worth considering, they do not imply that my 
findings are unimportant. For instance, although there is no way to exclude the 
problems inherent with survey research, conducting a survey can stilJ be a useful way 
to find out the opinions of a large number of people. As Babbie (1995:273) remarks, 
"surveys are particularly useful in describing the characteristics of a large 
population." Likewise, while it is a limitation of this study that I did not include 
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questions about every medium, it would have been impossible to include questions on 
each medium. Although the data are not perfect, they mark a considerable 
improvement over the data that previously existed. Indeed, prior to this study we 
knew virtually nothing about the relationship between state legislators and the media. 
Furthermore, no extant dataset addresses the use of the media by state legislators. 
Hopefully scholars will use these findings as a starting point of our question in our 
understanding of the press-government relationship in the states. Future works 
should consider other complimentary forms of data colJection-including, but not 
limited to face-to-face interviews and participant observation. 
Directions For Future Research 
As I indicated early in this study, there is no extant literature examining how state 
legislators use media to achieve their goals. As a result, this study is primarily 
descriptive. Since this research is only a first step, I now discuss some directions for 
future research. 
Journalists? 
As Tim Cook (1988; 1998) suggests, the production of news is best 
understood as a "negotiation of newsworthiness" between politician and reporter. 
Likewise, Zaller (2002) suggests that it is the intersection of the divergent goals of 
citizens, journalists and politicians that produces the final product of news. This 
study has provided a glimpse of the negotiation in the states from the perspective of 
the politician. Future studies should examine the negotiation from the perspective of 
the journalist. If we can gain a better understanding of the perspective of the 
politician and journalist, we will be able to a more complete understanding of the 
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totality of the press-media connection in the states. Among the questions that should 
be addressed include: how often are journalists approached by state legislators? How 
do statehouse journalists view their role? Do they feel they are political actors? Do 
they feel much pressure from editors regarding the content of their stories on state 
politics? How much freedom do they have in deciding what stories to cover at the 
statehouse? Some of these questions have been addressed in a rather dated look at 
capital reporters in Washington (Hess 1981), but no one has conducted a large-scale 
look at reporters in the states. 
Advertisements 
Although there is tremendous amount of literature examining the effects of 
political advertisements (particularly negative advertisements) on the electorate 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Diamond and Bates 1992; Kahn and Kenney 1999; 
Lau et. al 1999), a dearth of research has looked at state legislative candidates' 
decision to advertise. Although their resources are more limited than politicians at 
the national level, certainly state legislators advertise as well. This study does not 
specifically address the resources state legislators put into mass media advertising. 
This seems a natural direction for future research. Scholars should try to find out if 
state legislator's attempts to advertise differ from those of their national counterparts 
and if they do differ, how? By examining advertisements, we should be able to gain a 
more complete understanding of how state legislators use both free and paid media. 
Confirming a Hypothesis: The Role of Resources 
Chapter 5 suggests that as professionalism increases, so does a legislator's 
propensity to use media tactics. Although the legislator's view of the effectiveness of 
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media tactics may not change, the frequency with which she engages in these tactics 
will change. In short, these findings suggest that resources matter. From this, I 
hypothesize that as the resources afforded a politician increase, so does their 
propensity to use media tactics. Certainly, this is a hypothesis worth testing with 
more data and in more contexts. In particular, future studies should examine this 
question using legislators from more states. By examining more states, researchers 
will have more variation in resources among states. If the hypothesis holds, then as 
professionalism increases, so should a legislator's propensity to use media. Likewise, 
as professionalism (and therefore resources) decline, so should the frequency with 
which legislators use media to achieve their goals. 
This hypothesis should also be applicable to any level of government and any 
political actor-keeping with Malcolm Jewell's suggestion that "the goal of political 
science is to develop generalizations that are not limited to particular times and 
places" (Jewell 1982:4). In other words, if this hypothesis is worthwhile, then it 
should be applicable to the actions of many political actors-not just state legislators. 
One logical place to test this hypothesis would therefore be in the context of the 
Presidency. Presidents, like state legislators and members of Congress now have far 
more resources at their disposal than ever before. If my hypothesis is correct, then as 
Presidents' resources have increased, so have the frequency with which they use 
media tactics. Likewise, this finding should translate to members of Congress, 
members of the city council, mayors, governors and virtually any other political actor. 
In short, this hypothesis could make a real contribution to our understanding of the 
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relationship between politicians and the media, but it must be examined in multiple 
contexts before it can be accepted. 
State and Local Politics: A Research Agenda 
I have repeatedly suggested that there is far too little work examining 
relationship between state legis1ators and the media. Certain1y, the same can be said 
of other political actors in the states. For instance, while accounts of the President's 
media activities have produced scores of scholarly works (Cook and Ragsdale 1998; 
Kernell 1986; Pa1etz and Guthrie 1987; Smoller 1990; Tebbel and Watts 1985), 
considerably 1ess time has been spent examining the press activities of the Governor. 
Surely, this is an area ripe for research. Governors are increasingly powerful, both 
within their own state and on the national scene (Dometrius 1999). Certainly, the 
way in which Governors use the media to communicate is an area that is both 
understudied and highly important. For instance, Minnesota Governor, Jesse Ventura 
was able to ably use the media to get elected. Once in office, Ventura has been able '. 
to use the media to help legislate-something an independent politician like Ventura 
could have found quite difficult otherwise. 
Scholars have also spent very little time examining the press activities of state 
bureaucrats, members of the city council, mayors and a variety of other actors in state 
and local government. In short, state politics has received renewed interest in recent 
years. If we wish to obtain a complete understanding of how subnational government 
works, we must consider the media. Likewise, if we wish to have a complete picture 
of political communication in the United States, scholars must the press/government 
connection at the sub-national level. 
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Applying a Theoretical Framework 
As I have stated throughout this work, we know virtually nothing about the 
relationship between state legislators and the media. Likewise, there are no 
established theories of political communication to test. As a result, this dissertation 
has laid a descriptive foundation from which scholars can proceed. While description 
is a necessary step on the way to theory development, description cannot be the mark 
of research on state legislators and the media. Scholars must look to see what extant 
theoretical frameworks can help move past descriptive research on state legislators 
and the media. Although research in political communication has been notable for 
the absence of a unifying theory, there are two emerging possibilities that could help 
explain the relationship between politicians and the media in the United States. 
First, John Zaller has recently attempted to apply a rational choice framework 
to understanding political communication in the United States (Zaller 2002). Zaller 
posits that the relationship between politicians, journalists and citizens can best be 
understood under the rubric of rational choice theory. According to Zaller, each actor 
is pursuing her own rational ends. Politicians seek to receive the best media coverage 
possible. Journalists want to be able to exercise their '1ournalistic voice" at the same 
time they want to get big audiences-although they value the former much more than 
the latter. Finally, the public wants to be able to "monitor politics and hold 
politicians accountable with minimal effort" (Zaller 2002: 1-2). In Zaller's view, it is 
the convergence of these three interests that produces the media politics seen today. 
While Zaller's book focuses on presidential selection, certainly his framework could 
be applied to our understanding of the relationship between the media and the state 
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legislature. Future works should consider applying this rational choice framework to 
the relationship between state legislators, journalists and the public. 
Alternately, scholars could apply a theory borrowed from cognitive 
psychology-prospect theory. While many are not willing to accept rational choice's 
emphasis on rational, goal seeking behavior, prospect theory modifies the consistently 
rational behavior assumed by rational choice theory. Prospect theory argues that 
individuals will act differently in different situations. Specifically, prospect theory 
posits that individuals receive diminishing value from continually increasing gains. 
Conversely, individuals feel losses more strenuously than gains. So, in practice, "the 
sting of loss is more acute than is the enjoyment derived from an equal gain" 
(Berejekian 1997:790). Although this framework has never been applied to po1itical · 
communication, it seems that it could help illuminate why political actors and 
journalists act differently in different situations. Specifically, prospect theory would 
suggest that journalists do not always use the same means to gather stories. When 
journalists have little information (and are thus in a "losses frame"), they would be 
willing to engage in riskier behavior-including accepting a politician's press 
releases and statements with less filtering. When they have a lot of information (and 
are thus in a "gains frame"), they will be less willing to help the politician reach her 
goal of publicity. Likewise, when a state legislator is in a losses frame (losing on a 
key piece of legislation, or losing in the pol1s for the next election), she is more likely 
to engage in risky behavior and actively seek media coverage-regardless of the 
outcome. 
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Certainly, these are not the only two theoretical frameworks that could be 
applied to our understanding of state legislators and the media. Nonetheless, they 
provide a brief glimpse of two particularly promising theories that could be applied to 
the subject. Future studies should engage in more explicit theory testing and theory 
building to see whether rational choice or prospect theory can illuminate more of our 
understanding of how the relationship between state legislators and the media takes 
place. 
Conclusion 
The relationship between media and the state legislature has been almost universally 
ignored in the scholarly literature. This dissertation provides a first step toward 
understanding how media have altered decision-making and behavior in the state 
legislature. Its results have direct implications for representation and legislative 
behavior in the states. Furthermore, the resource definition of media entrepreneurship 
provided here provides an intuitively appealing hypothesis ready to be tested at other 
levels of government. If this dissertation provides nothing else, it should demonstrate 
conclusively that media are important in state legislative politics. Scholars should 
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Table 1: Comparing Validity in Research Designs 
Internal Validity 
External Validity 




Most Different Systems 
Low 
High 





a= King (2000) 

















Table 3: Comparing the Sample to the Population 
California Georgia Iowa 
Po:eulation Sam:ele Po:eulation Sam:ele Po:eulation Sam:ele 
Male 75% 75% 80% 77% 80% 78% 
Democrat 63% 58% 58% 57% 41% 32% 
Upper House 33% 32% 24% 22% 33% 35% 
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THE MEDIA ENTREPRENEUR 
National Media 




-Washington Coalition Cue Givers 
-Congressional Cue Givers 







Figure 1: The Enterprise Process1 










Table 4: Percent of Legislators That Agree or Strongly Agree With the Following Statements 
Question CA GA IA All States 
Combined 
1) Members often solicit media exposure as a way to 100% 79% 90% 87% 
stimu]ate discussion about policy proposa]s 
2) SoJiciting media exposure is an effective way to put 94% 65% 73% 74% 
an issue on the Jegislative agenda 
3) Media exposure is an effective way to convince 76% 50% 51% 56% 
other legislators in both chambers to support policy 
proposa]s 
4) Media exposure is an effective way to stimulate 94% 72% 71% 76% --.,l discussion on policy a]tematives and issues among 0 
executive branch officia]s 
N= 34 68 67 179 
Table 5: Frequency Legislators Engage in Various Activities 
All States CA GA IA 
Median Median Median Median 
(Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean) 
Traditional Tactics 
Contacting Other Legislators 4 4 4 4 
Directly (3.7) (3.8) (3.7) (3.8) 
Proposing Legislation 3 4 4 3 
(3.4) (3.7) (3.4) (3.4) 
Contacting Government 3 3 3 3 
Agencies (3.2) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) 
Contacting the Governor's 3 3 3 3 
Office (2.9) (3.1) (3.1) (2.8) 
Speaking on the floor 3 3 3 3 
(3.1) (3.3) (3.2) (3.2) 
Meeting with Lobbyists 4 4 3 4 
(3.5) (3.7) (3.4) (3.7) 
Meeting with party caucus 4 4 3 4 
(3.5) (3.6) (3.3) (3.7) 
Media Tactics 
Appearing on TV news 2 3 2 2 
(2.3) (2.8) (2.3) (2.3) 
Writing op-eds 3 3 3 3 
(2.7) (3.3) (2.5) (2.8) 
Issuing press releases 3 3 3 3 
(3.2) (3.7) (3.2) (3.1) 
Appearing on public access 2 4 2 2 
TV (2.2) (2.8) (2.3) (2.0) 
4=Frequently; 3= Occasionally; 2=Rarely; 1 =Never 
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Table 6: Perceived Effectiveness of Various Activities 
All States CA GA IA 
Median Median Median Median 
(Mean) 
Traditional Tactics 
Contacting Other Legislators 2 2 2 3 
Directly (2.5) (2.4) (2.5) (2.7) 
Proposing Legislation 3 3 3 3 
(2.9) (2.9) (2.9) (3.1) 
Contacting Government 3 3 3 3 
Agencies (3.2) (3.2) (3.2) (3.3) 
Contacting the Governor's 3 3 3 4 
Office (3.3) (3.2) (3.2) (3.5) 
Speaking on the floor 3 4 3 3 
(3.3) (3.7) (3.)) (3.4) 
Meeting with Lobbyists 3 3 3 3 
(3.0) (3.1) (3.0) (3.1) 
Meeting with party caucus 3 3 3 3 
(3.0) (3.1) (3.3) (2.9) 
Media Tactics 
Appearing on TV news 4 3 3 4 
(3.2) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) 
Writing op-eds 4 4 4 4 
(3.4) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) 
Issuing press releases 4 3 3 4 
(3.3) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Appearing on public access 4 4 4 4 
TV (3.4) (3.6) (3.4) (3.4) 
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Figure 3: Whom Are Members Trying to Reach With Their Media Activities? 
Table 7: OLS Regression on T;n~es of Media Activities 
All States CA GA IA 
B B B B 
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
F~uencx Effectiveness Frequencx Effectiveness Frequencx Effectiveness· Frequencx Effectiveness 
Constant 10.4** 11.8** 11.53** 11.65* 9.95** 12.29 11.76 12.01 
(.1.06) (1.77) (2.83) (4.59) (2.09) (2.9) ( 1.15) (2.45) 
Media .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .04 -.05 
Market (.019) (.03) (.02) (.04) (.07) (.09) (.04) (.09) 
%Vote -.01 .01 .03 .06 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.03 
(.01) (.01) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) 
Urban .05 -.21 -.04 -1.6* .14 .33 -.71 -.15 
(.147) (.25) (.49) (.79) (.28) (.39) (.46) (.98) 
Age .30 .04 .34 -.32 .94* .67 -.47 -.55 - (.22) (.36) (.54) (.90) (.41) (.57) (.28) (.58) -.J .,:.. 
Leader .32 .28 -.95 3.56 .98 -.24 -.20 .23 
(.36) (.60) (1.17) (1.9) (.62) (.87) (.45) (.96) 
Male -.17 -1.6** -.27 -.90 -.25 -1.71 -.03 -1.77 
(.38) (.63) (.92) (1.49) (.71) (.98) (.49) (1.04) 
Majority -.55 -.51 -.85 -.81 -.55 -.16 -.71 -.55 
Party (.33) (.55) (.93) (1.51) (.63) (.89) (.46) (.58) 
California 2.31** 1.3 
(.54) (.89) 
Iowa .14 .01 
(.37) (.62) 
R .25 .07 .17 .34 .19 .13 .10 .11 
*Statisticall:}'. significant at 0.05; **Statisticall:}'. si&!!ificant at 0.01. 
Table 8: Media in the Policy Process 
"The media may be used at various stages in the legislative process. How often do 
you solicit media attention for each of the following stages of the policy process? 
( 4=frequently; 1 =never) 
Stage in the Policy Process Mean Score Median Score N 
To raise awareness of a problem 2.93 3.0 190 
To inform and influence interest groups 2.90 3.0 186 
To frame the terms of debate 2.67 3.0 184 
To find support for a floor vote 2.57 3.0 185 
To move a bill through committee 2.53 3.0 187 
To respond to proposals from the 2.51 3.0 186 
governor 
To respond to decisions and proposals 2.49 2.0 187 
from government agencies 
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Table 9: Reported Use of Various Media Sources 
When you are seeking information regarding public policy, how often do you consult 
each of the following sources? (4=frequently; l=never) 
News Source Mean Score Median Score N 
Newspaper(s) in district 3.5 4.0 187 
Local newscasts in district 3.3 3.0 188 
Paper of record in state capital 3.0 3.0 184 
Local newscasts in the state 2.8 3.0 188 
capital 
Specialized trade publications 2.8 3.0 187 
and newsletters 
The Internet 2.6 3.0 188 
Alternative newspaper in state 2.6 2.0 186 
capital 
Local public access cable 2.3 2.0 187 
CNN 2.3 2.0 189 
National Public Radio 2.2 2.0 187 
Wall Street Journal 1.9 2.0 188 
Weekly magazines (Time, 1.9 2.0 187 
Newsweek) 
New York Times 1.7 2.0 188 
Washington Post 1.6 1.0 187 
Christian Science Monitor 1.5 1.0 187 
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Table 10: OLS Regression on Legislator Use of Media as a Source of Policy Information 
Variable All Media Print Media TV NPR Internet 
Constant 3.043 ••• 2.526*** 3.112*** 3.171*** 3.774*** 
(.568) (.609) (.785) (1.114) (1.252) 
Entrepreneurship .105** .095* .216*** .014 .035 
(.053) (.057) (.072) (.026) (.029) 
Georgia -.247** -.166 -.091 -.544** -.486* 
(.117) (.125) (.159) (.225) (.253) 
Iowa -.246** -.160 -.183 -.146 -.715*** 
(.119) (.127) (.163) (.231) (.261) 
District Income -.001 .001 -.001 *** .001• .001 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Democrat .281 ... .237** .291** .917*** -.003 
(.090 (.096) (.123) (.175) (.196) 
Upper House -.057 -.058 -.049 .173 -.083 
(.086) (.092) (.119) (.168) (.189) 
Age .001 -.003 .001 .001 .001 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) 
Male -.193* -.098 -.319** -.485*** -.103 
(.092) (.106) (.129) (.186) (.206) 
Leader -.022 .037 .029 -.176 -.236 
(.092) (.098) (.125) (.176) (.199) 
R2 .233 .143 .238 .274 .114 
N 141 144 148 150 150 
F 4.466*** 2.503*** 4.833*** 5.908*** 2.010*** 






















November 16, 1999 
Dear Legislator, 
I am a graduate student in political science at the University of Tennessee who is 
specializing in the study of state legislatures. I need your help by filling out the 
enclosed survey questionnaire regarding media use by state legislators. Little is 
known about the ways in which state legislators use the media to advance their policy 
goals and stances. In order to add to the knowledge base in political science and 
communications, I am conducting a study about the frequency with which state 
legislators use the media as well as the different ways and times in which this occurs. 
Legislators in California, Iowa, Georgia and Pennsylvania have been chosen to 
participate in this survey. Due to the relatively small number of states being 
surveyed, your participation is extremely important. You will be representing many 
legislators in states similar to your own. 
Please take a few moments to complete the questionnaire and return it in the enclosed 
self-addressed stamped envelope. It would be very helpful to have your completed 
questionnaire returned as soon as possible. 
Your responses are confidential. No names or individual information will be 
released or used in this study. If you have any questions please call me at (423) 
521-7311 or e-mail me at cooper23@utk.edu. Thank you very much for your 
participation 
Sincerely, 
Christopher A. Cooper 
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May 24, 2000 
Dear Legislator: 
About two months ago I wrote to you seeking your opinion on media use in the state 
legislature. As of today I have not yet received your completed questionnaire. 
I am writing to you again because of the significance each questionnaire has to the 
usefulness of this study. Legislators in Iowa, Georgia and California have been 
chosen for this study. In order for the results of this study to be truly representative of 
the opinions of all legislators, it is essential that each person in the sample return their 
questionnaire. 
In the event that your questionnaire has been misplaced, a replacement is enclosed. 
If you have already returned your questionnaire, please disregard this letter. Thank 
you very much for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Christopher A. Cooper 
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MEDIA USE IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. This survey should take no longer than 5-10 minutes to 
complete. All thoughts and comments are welcome. Please feel free to attach any additional pages as 
necessary. 
i. Are you a: 
__ Legislator 
__ Staff Member ➔ How long have you worked for your current employer? ____ _ 
SECTION I 
Please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following 
statements. 
1. Members of the state legislature often solicit media exposure (i.e. interviews, talk show 
appearances, op-eds, press releases, etc.) as a way to stimulate discussion about policy 
proposals. 
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know 
2. Soliciting media exposure is not a particularly effective way to put an issue on the legislative 
agenda. 
Strong]y Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know 
3. Media exposure is an effective way to convince other legislators in both chambers to support 
policy proposals. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know 
4. Media exposure is an effective way to stimulate discussion on policy alternatives and issues 
among executive branch officials. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Don't Know 
SECTION II 
5. Legislators may engage in a variety of activities in order to achieve theit public policy goals. 
Please indicate how often you engage each of the following activities. 
a. Contacting other legislators directly Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
b. Appearing on television news programs Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
c. Proposing legislation Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
d. Writing op-ed articles Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
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e. Contacting governmental agencies Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
r. Issuing press releases Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
g. Contacting the governor's office Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
h. Appearing on public access television Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
i. Speaking on the floor Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
j. Meeting with lobbyists Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
k. Meeting with party caucus Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
I. Other (please specify) Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
SECTION III 
6. In your opinion, what is the relative effectiveness of each of the following activities for 
furthering 
your policy goals? 
Please evaluate according to the following scale: 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
a. Contacting other legislators directly 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
b. Appearing on television news programs 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
c. Proposing legislation 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
d. Writing op-ed articles 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
e. Contacting governmental agencies 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
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f. Issuing press releases 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
g. Contacting the governor's office 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
h. Appearing on public access television 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
i. Speaking on the ftoor 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
j. Meeting with lobbyists 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
k. Meeting with party caucus 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
L Other (please specify) 
Not Effective Somewhat Effective Effective Very Effective No Opinion 
SECTION Ill 
7. Many members of the state legislature use strategies such as writing op-ed articles and 
conducting interviews with reporters to publicize their ideas and policy positions. In your 
opinion, who are these members trying to reach through these efforts? (Check all that 
apply) 
__ Colleagues in their own party 
__ Colleagues in the other party 
__ Legislative staff 
__ Their party leadership 
__ Executives in state agencies 
__ The governor's office 
__ Interest groups 
__ Other media 
__ Constituents 
__ The public outside their constituency 
__ Other (please specify) _____ _ 
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8. The media may be used at various stages in the legislative process. How often do you 
solicit media attention for each of the following stages of the policy process? 
a. To raise awareness of a problem (to place an item on the agenda) 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
b. To frame the terms of debate 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
c. To respond to proposals from the governor 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
d. To respond to decisions and proposals from government agencies 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
e. To move a bill through committee 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
f. To fmd support for a floor vote 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
g. To inform and influence interest groups 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
h. Other (please specify) 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
9. When you are seeking information regarding public policy, how often do you consult each 
of the following sources? 
i. Print Media 
a. Paper of record in the state capital 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
b. Alternative newspaper in the state capital 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
C. Newspaper(s) in your district 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
d. Specialized trade publications and newsletters 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
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e. Wall Street Journal 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
f. New York Times 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
g. Washington Post 
Frequently . Occasionally Rarely Never 
h. Christian Science Monitor 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
i. Weekly newsmagazines (e.g. Time, Newsweek) 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
j. Other (please specify) 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
ii. Electronic media 
a. National Public Radio 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
b. CNN 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
-----c. Local newscasts in the state capital 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
d. Local newscasts in your district 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
e. Local public access television 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
r. The Internet 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
g. Other (please specify) 
Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never 
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SECTION IV 
The following section refers to legislator use of computer technology. 
10. Do you have an e-mail account? 
__ Yes (If yes, continue with item 11) 
__ No (Ifno, please skip to item 13) 
1 t. In an average week, how often do you check your e-mail? 
__ More than once a day 
__ Onceaday 
__ Every other day 
__ Once a week 
__ Less than once a week 
12. Who do you use e-mail to communicate with? (check all that apply) 
__ Constituents 
__ Other legislators 
__ Government agencies 
__ Governor's office 
__ Party leaders 
Personal use 
__ Other (please specify) ____ _ 
13. Many legislators have web pages to communicate info·rmation about themselves, their 
district and their policy goals. Do you have a web page associated with your job as 
legislator? 
__ Yes (If yes, please continue with item 14) 
__ No (lfno, please skip to item 16) 




__ Less than monthly 
15. Who are you trying to reach with your web page? (Check all that apply) 
__ Constituents 
__ Other legislators 
__ Government agencies 
__ Governor's office 
__ Party leaders 
__ Other (please specify) ___ _ 
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SECTIONV 
The final set of questions refers to the legislator,s background. (If you are staff, please answer 
these questions in reference to the legislator for whom you work). 
16. In what year were you born? 
17. What is your primary occupation? 
18. How would you describe your legislative district? (Check all that apply) 
__ There is a large city (more than l 00,000 people in it) 
__ Urban but no cities over I 00,000 
__ A mixture of urban and rural 
__ Mostly rural 
__ Mostly suburban 
19. Are you a: (check all that apply) 
__ Member of the party leadership 
__ Committee chair or ranking committee member 
__ Subcommittee chair or ranking subcommittee member 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
If you have any additional comments, please attach a separate sheet of paper. If you 
would like to receive a copy of the results of this survey, please include your name 




A NOTE ON ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION 
Throughout this work, I make frequent use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. In this appendix, I briefly describe what regression means and how OLS 
regression differs from other forms of regression. 
Regression is "a statistical method that allows you to draw the line of best fit 
and to make predictions ... " (Spatz 1993: 81). In its most basic form, regression is 
concerned with the effect of one independent or causal variable on another dependent 
variable. This is called bivariate regression. Unfortunately, "since most variables 
have more than one cause, it is necessary to use multiple regression ... , assuming that 
measures of more than one cause are available. Multiple regression is particularly 
appropriate when the causes (independent variables) are intercorrelated, which again 
is usually the case" (McClendon 1994: 60). Throughout this dissertation, I am mostly 
interested in the effect of a number of different independent variables on one 
dependent variable, controlling for other causes. Multiple regression is the best tool 
to find out the dynamics of such a relationship. 
There are a number of different forms of regression, and each comes with its 
own assumptions. OLS regression assumes homoscedasticity, or equal variance, no 
autocorrelation, no specification bias or error, and no perfect multicollinearity. If 
these conditions are satisfied, one may use OLS regression (Gujarati 1995). None of 
the models in this work appear to violate these assumptions. 
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